Complexity Results for Preference Aggregation over (m)CP-nets: Pareto and Majority Voting by Lukasiewicz, T & Malizia, E
Complexity Results for Preference Aggregation over (m)CP-nets:
Pareto and Majority VotingI
Thomas Lukasiewicza, Enrico Maliziab,∗
aDepartment of Computer Science, University of Oxford, UK
bDepartment of Computer Science, University of Exeter, UK
Abstract
Aggregating preferences over combinatorial domains has many applications in artificial intelligence (AI). Given the
inherent exponential nature of preferences over combinatorial domains, compact representation languages are needed
to represent them, and (m)CP-nets are among the most studied ones. Sequential and global voting are two different
ways of aggregating preferences represented via CP-nets. In sequential voting, agents’ preferences are aggregated
feature-by-feature. For this reason, sequential voting may exhibit voting paradoxes, i.e., the possibility to select
sub-optimal outcomes when preferences have specific feature dependencies. To avoid paradoxes in sequential voting,
one has often assumed the (quite) restrictive constraint of O-legality, which imposes a shared common topological
order among all the agents’ CP-nets. On the contrary, in global voting, CP-nets are considered as a whole during the
preference aggregation process. For this reason, global voting is immune from the voting paradoxes of sequential
voting, and hence there is no need to impose restrictions over the CP-nets’ structure when preferences are aggregated
via global voting. Sequential voting over O-legal CP-nets received much attention, and O-legality of CP-nets has
often been required in other studies. On the other hand, global voting over non-O-legal CP-nets has not carefully been
analyzed, despite it was explicitly stated in the literature that a theoretical comparison between global and sequential
voting was highly promising and a precise complexity analysis for global voting has been asked for multiple times.
In quite a few works, only very partial results on the complexity of global voting over CP-nets have been given. In
this paper, we start to fill this gap by carrying out a thorough computational complexity analysis of global voting
tasks, for Pareto and majority voting, over not necessarily O-legal acyclic binary polynomially connected (m)CP-nets.
We show that all these problems belong to various levels of the polynomial hierarchy, and some of them are even in
P or LOGSPACE. Our results are a notable achievement, given that the previously known upper bound for most of
these problems was the complexity class EXPTIME. We provide various exact complexity results showing tight lower
bounds and matching upper bounds for problems that (up to now) did not have any explicit non-obvious lower bound.
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1. Introduction
The problem of managing and aggregating agent preferences has attracted extensive interest in the computer science
community (see, e.g., the comprehensive survey by Brandt et al. [21]), because methods for representing and reasoning
about preferences are very important in artificial intelligence (AI) applications, such as recommender systems [70],
(group) product configuration [15, 30, 77], (group) planning [14, 72, 73, 76], (group) preference-based constraint5
satisfaction [9, 12, 18], and (group) preference-based query answering/information retrieval [10, 28, 63, 64].
IPreliminary results of this paper have appeared in the Proceedings of the 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-16) [61].
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In computer science, the study of preference aggregation has often been based on the solid ground of social
choice theory, which is the branch of economics analyzing methods for collective decision making [5, 6]. Having a
well-founded theory and practice on how to properly and efficiently manage and aggregate preferences of real software
agents, and hence support the growth and use of these technologies, has been one of the main drivers for investigating10
social choice theory from a computational perspective.
In social choice theory, the actual ways of representing agent preferences are rarely taken into consideration,
also because the size of the sets of candidates considered is usually, although not always, relatively small. For this
reason, most of the insights obtained in the computational social choice literature about the computational properties of
preference aggregation functions (or voting procedures) have assumed that agent preferences over the set of candidates15
are extensively listed (see the survey by Brandt et al. [21] and references therein). Although this is perfectly reasonable
when we reason about, e.g., (political) elections among a not too numerous set of human candidates, this is not feasible
when the voting domain (i.e., the set of candidates) has a combinatorial structure [22, 52, 55]. By combinatorial
structure, we mean that the set of candidates (or outcomes) is the Cartesian product of finite value domains for each of
a set of features (also called variables, or issues, or attributes). The problem of aggregating agents’ preferences over20
combinatorial domains (or multi-issue domains) is called a combinatorial vote [51, 52].
Interestingly, votes over domains exhibiting a combinatorial structure are rather common. For example, in 2012,
on the day of the US presidential election, voters in California had also to vote for eleven referenda [55]. As another
example, it may be the case that the inhabitants of a town have to make a joint decision about different related issues
regarding their community, which could be whether and where to build new public facilities (such as a swimming25
pool or a library), or whether to levy new taxes. Note that these voting scenarios are often also called multiple
elections or multiple referenda [19, 22, 54, 55, 83, 84]. Other examples are group product configurations and group
planning [55, 77]. As for the latter, consider, e.g., a situation in which multiple autonomous agents have to agree upon
a shared plan of actions to reach a goal that is preferred by the group as a whole, such as a group of autonomous robots
coordinating during the exploration of a remote area/planet. Each robot has a specific task to accomplish, and the group30
as a whole coordinates to achieve a common goal. That is, the robots have their own specific preferences over a vast
amount of variables/features emerging from the contingency of the situation to complete their individual tasks, however,
their individual preferences have to be blended together. These examples show the great relevance of dealing with
combinatorial votes, and hence the pressing necessity of finding ways to represent agent preferences over multi-issue
domains and algorithms for aggregating them.35
Combinatorial domains contain an exponential number of outcomes in the number of features, and hence compact
representations for combinatorial preferences are needed [52, 55] (see also Section 6.1 for more background). The
graphical model of CP-nets [11] is among the most studied of these representations, as proven by a vast literature
on them. In CP-nets, the vertices of a graph represent features, and an edge from vertex A to vertex B models the
influence of the value of feature A on the choice of the value of feature B. Intuitively, this model captures preferences40
like “if the rest of the dinner is the same, with a fish dish (A’s value), I prefer a white wine (B’s value)”, also called
conditional ceteris paribus preferences; a more detailed example is given below.
Example 1.1. Assume that we want to model one’s preferences for a dinner with a main dish and a wine [11]. In the
CP-net in Figure 1a, an edge from vertex Main to vertex Wine models that the value of feature Main influences the
choice of the value of feature Wine. More precisely, m and f are the possible values of feature Main, and they denote45
“meat” and “ f ish”, respectively, while r and w are the possible values of feature Wine, and they denote “red (wine)”
and “white (wine)”, respectively. The table associated with feature Wine specifies that when a meat dish is chosen, then
a red wine is preferred to a white one, and when a fish main is chosen, then a white wine is preferred to a red wine.
The table associated with feature Main indicates that a meat dish is preferred to a fish one. These tables are called CP
tables. A CP-net like this one can represent the above conditional ceteris paribus preference “given that the rest of the50
dinner does not change, with a meat dish (Main’s value), I prefer a red wine (Wine’s value)”.
Every CP-net has an associated induced preference graph [11], whose vertices are all the possible outcomes of the
domain, and whose edges connect outcomes differing on only one value. More precisely, there is a directed edge from
an outcome to another if the latter is preferred to the former according to the preferences encoded in the tables of the
CP-net. Figure 1b shows the induced preference graph of the CP-net in Figure 1a, having as vertices all the possible55
combinations for the dinner, and there is, e.g., an edge from mw to mr, because the combination meat and red wine is
preferred to the combination meat and white wine. The preferences encoded in a CP-net are the transitive closure of its
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(a) A CP-net modeling dinner preferences. (b) The CP-net’s induced preference graph.
Figure 1: A CP-net and its preference graph.
Figure 2: Dinner preferences of Alice, Bob, and Chuck (in this order) modeled via CP-nets (above) and their induced preference graphs (below).
induced preference graph. Intuitively, an outcome α is preferred to an outcome β according to the preferences of a
CP-net, if there is a directed path from β to α in the induced preference graph, in which case α is said to dominate β. C
CP-nets are also used to model preferences of groups of individuals, obtaining a multi-agent model, called60
mCP-nets [71], which is a set, or profile, of CP-nets, one for each agent. The preference semantics of mCP-nets is
defined via voting schemes: through its own individual CP-net, every agent votes whether an outcome is preferred
to another. Various voting schemes were proposed for mCP-nets [59, 71], and different voting schemes give rise to
different dominance semantics for mCP-nets. In this paper, we consider Pareto and majority voting as they were defined
by Rossi et al. [71]. In the voting schemes proposed for mCP-nets, the voting protocol adopted, i.e., the actual way65
in which votes are collected [24], is global voting [53, 55]. In this protocol, the results of the voting procedure are
computed by having as input the CP-nets as a whole (see Section 6.2 for related works on different voting protocols
over CP-nets).
Example 1.2. Consider again the dinner scenario, and assume that there are three agents (Alice, Bob, and Chuck),
expressing their preferences via CP-nets (see Figure 2). In Pareto voting, an outcome α dominates an outcome β, if all70
agents prefers α to β. In majority voting, an outcome α dominates an outcome β, if the majority of agents prefers α to β.
The outcome fr is not Pareto optimal, because there is an outcome (namely mr), which is preferred to fr by all
the agents. The outcome mw, instead, is Pareto optimal, because there is no outcome Pareto dominating mw. Hence,
from a Pareto perspective, mw is better than fr. The outcome mw, however, is not majority optimal, because mr
majority dominates mw (Alice and Chuck prefer mr to mw). On the other hand, mr is majority optimal, because there75
is no outcome majority dominating mr. Hence, from a majority perspective, mr is better than mw. Moreover, again
according to the majority voting scheme, mr is a very good outcome, because mr is also majority optimum, which
means that mr majority dominates all other outcomes. On the contrary, in this example, there is no Pareto optimum
outcome, i.e., there is no outcome Pareto dominating all other outcomes. C
In the literature, a comparison between sequential voting (which is another voting protocol; see Section 6.2) and80
global voting over CP-nets was explicitly asked for and stated to be highly promising [53]. However, global voting over
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Figure 3: Summary of the complexity results obtained in this paper for global voting over CP-nets. Membership results above P are valid for any
representation scheme whose dominance test is in NP (for example, polynomially connected classes of CP-nets). *A different proof is provided by
Rossi et al. [71].
CP-nets has not been as thoroughly investigated as sequential voting. In fact, unlike CP-nets, which were extensively
analyzed, a precise complexity analysis of mCP-nets has been missing for a long time, as explicitly mentioned several
times in the literature [53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 74]—since the dominance semantics for mCP-nets is global voting over
CP-nets, in the following, we use them interchangeably. Furthermore, it was conjectured that the complexity of85
computing majority optimal and majority optimum outcomes in mCP-nets is harder than NP and co-NP [56, 58].
Contributions. The aim of this paper is to explore the complexity of mCP-nets (and hence of global voting over
CP-nets). In particular, we focus on acyclic binary polynomially connected mCP-nets (see Section 2 for these notions)
built with standard CP-nets, i.e., the constituent CP-nets of an mCP-net rank all the features, and they are not partial
CP-nets (which instead were allowed in the original definition of mCP-nets [71]). Unlike what is often assumed in the90
literature, in this work, we do not restrict the profiles of CP-nets to be O-legal (which means that there is a topological
order common to all the CP-nets of the profile; see Section 6.3). We carry out a thorough complexity analysis for the
(a) Pareto and (b) majority voting schemes, as defined by Rossi et al. [71], of deciding (1) dominance, (2) optimal
and (3) optimum outcomes, and (4) the existence of optimal and (5) optimum outcomes. Deciding the dominance for
a voting scheme s means deciding, given two outcomes, whether one dominates the other according to s. Deciding95
whether an outcome is optimal or optimum for a voting scheme s means deciding whether the outcome is not dominated
or dominates all others, respectively, according to s. Deciding the existence of optimal and optimum outcomes is the
natural extension of the previous problems.
A summary of the complexity results obtained in this paper is provided in Figure 3. More precisely, deciding
dominance and optimal outcomes is complete for NP and co-NP, respectively, for both Pareto and majority voting,100
while deciding the existence of optimal outcomes can be done in constant time for Pareto voting and is complete for ΣP2
for majority voting. Furthermore, deciding optimum outcomes and their existence is in LOGSPACE and P for Pareto
voting, and complete for ΠP2 and between Π
P
2 and D
P
2 for majority voting, respectively.
It thus turns out that Pareto voting is the easiest voting scheme to evaluate among the two analyzed here. More
precisely, both Pareto and majority dominance are NP-complete, however, only the complexity of majority dominance105
carries over to deciding optimal and optimum outcomes and their existence, and causes a substantial increase of their
complexity, e.g., deciding the existence of majority optimal and optimum outcomes is hard for ΣP2 and Π
P
2 , respectively.
This is due to the fact that majority voting is structurally more complex than Pareto voting. Intuitively, Pareto voting is
based on unanimity, hence, to disprove Pareto dominance between two outcomes, it suffices to find one agent that does
not agree with the dominance relationship. This particular structure of Pareto voting makes the other tasks not more110
difficult than the dominance test or even tractable. Our results hence prove the conjecture posed by Li et al. [56, 58]
about majority voting tasks over (m)CP-nets being harder than NP and co-NP.
We show completeness results for most cases, and we provide tight lower bounds for problems that (up to date) did
not have any explicit lower bound transcending the obvious hardness due to the dominance test over the underlying
CP-nets. Many of our results are intractability results, where the problems are put at various levels of the polynomial115
hierarchy. However, although intractability is usually “bad” news, these results are quite interesting, as for most of
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these tasks, only EXPTIME upper bounds were known in the literature to date [71]. Even more interestingly, some of
these problems are actually tractable, as they are in P or even LOGSPACE, which is a huge leap from EXPTIME.
Our hardness results are given for binary acyclic polynomially connected (m)CP-nets. This means that our
hardness results extend to classes of (m)CP-nets encompassing the CP-nets considered here, and in particular also120
to general mCP-nets with partial CP-nets or multi-valued features. More generally, the hardness results proven here
extend to any representation scheme as “expressive and succinct” as the class of CP-nets used in the proofs (see
Section 2.5). Moreover, the membership results above P that we prove here extend to any “NP-representation” scheme
(see Section 2.5). Our hardness results on the existence of optimal and optimum outcomes also provide lower bounds
for the computational problems. Indeed, actually computing optimal or optimum outcomes cannot be easier than the125
bounds shown here, because otherwise it would be possible to decide their existence more efficiently.
Characterizing the precise computational complexity of these problems, apart from providing the analysis requested
in the literature [53], means understanding their sources of complexity. This information allows us to identify tractable
instances by limiting some sources of intractability, and to design and analyze algorithms. For instance, note that any
ΣP2-complete problem exhibits two orthogonal sources of intractability. To give an idea of a practical consequence of130
this fact, assume that we would like to solve such a problem on a standard (deterministic) machine. Then, the theory
tells us that we cannot design any flat-backtracking algorithm for our problem, unless P = NP. Indeed, any algorithm
with a search-space tree having a polynomial number of levels (and such that moving along the tree edges does not take
exponential time) should solve a nested co-NP-hard problem to check whether a leaf node is a solution or not. That is,
checking leaf-feasibility is an intractable problem as well, and hence it requires a nested call to a further backtracking135
procedure (or to another kind of procedure with an exponential-time worst case).
Organization of the paper. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some preliminaries. In
Section 3, we prove some basic complexity results for CP-nets. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the complexity of Pareto and
majority voting, respectively: first, we analyze the complexity of dominance testing; then, we study the complexity of
deciding whether an outcome is optimal and whether there exists an optimal outcome; and we conclude by dealing with140
the complexity of deciding whether an outcome is optimum and whether there exists an optimum outcome. In Section 6,
we discuss related works. Section 7 summarizes the main results and gives an outlook on future research. For several
results, we give only proof sketches in the body of the paper, while detailed proofs are provided in Appendix A.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we give some preliminaries, briefly recalling from the literature preference relations and aggregation,145
conditional preference nets (CP-nets), CP-nets for groups of m agents (mCP-nets), and the complexity classes that we
will encounter in our complexity results. We also define a formal framework for preference representation schemes,
because our membership results will be given for generic representations whose dominance test is in NP.
2.1. Preference relations and aggregation
Before dwelling upon the details of CP-nets, which is the specific preference representation analyzed in this paper,150
we now give an introductory overview of the general concepts of preferences and their aggregation.
In this paper, a preference relation R over a set of outcomes O is a strict order over O, i.e., R is a binary relation over
O that is irreflexive (i.e., 〈α, α〉 < R), asymmetric (i.e., if 〈α, β〉 ∈ R, then 〈β, α〉 < R), and transitive (i.e., if 〈α, β〉 ∈ R
and 〈β, γ〉 ∈ R, then 〈α, γ〉 ∈ R). A preference ranking R is a preference relation that is total (i.e., either 〈α, β〉 ∈ R or
〈β, α〉 ∈ R for any two different outcomes α and β). Usually, given two outcomes α and β, their preference relationship155
stated in R is denoted by α R β, instead of 〈α, β〉 ∈ R, which means that, in R, α is strictly preferred to β, or α
dominates β. On the other hand, α 6R β means that 〈α, β〉 < R, and α ./R β means that 〈α, β〉 < R and 〈β, α〉 < R, i.e.,
α and β are incomparable in R. Observe that in a preference ranking, it cannot be the case that two outcomes are
incomparable. Given a preference relation R, an outcome α is optimal in R if there is no outcome β such that β R α.
We say that α is optimum in R, if for all outcomes β such that β , α, it holds that α R β. If there is an optimum160
outcome in R, then it is unique. For notational convenience, if the preference relation R is clear from the context, we
do not explicitly mention R as a subscript in the notations above. In the following, if not stated otherwise, when we
speak of preferences structures, we mean preference relations.
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In preference aggregation, we deal with preferences of multiple agents. A preference profileP = 〈R1, . . . ,Rm〉 is a
set1 of m preference relations. We assume that all the preferences Ri ofP are defined over the same set of outcomes,165
i.e., the agents express their preferences over the same set of candidates. In this paper, we focus on voting procedures
based on comparisons of pairs of outcomes (see, e.g., the work by Baumeister and Rothe [7] for a classification
of different kinds of preference aggregation procedures). For this reason, we need to define the following sets of
agents. For a profile P = 〈R1, . . . ,Rm〉, we denote by S P(α, β) = {i | α Ri β}, S ≺P(α, β) = {i | α ≺Ri β}, and
S ./P(α, β) = {i | α ./Ri β}, the sets of agents preferring α to β, preferring β to α, and for which α and β are incomparable,170
respectively.
The voting schemes considered in this paper are Pareto and majority. The definition of their dominance semantics
over preference profiles, reported below, is a generalization of the respective definition over mCP-nets given by Rossi
et al. [71].
Pareto: An outcome β Pareto dominates an outcome α, denoted β p
P
α, if all agents prefer β to α, i.e., |S 
P
(β, α)| = m.175
Majority An outcome β majority dominates an outcome α, denoted β maj
P
α, if the majority of the agents prefer β
to α, i.e., |S 
P
(β, α)| > |S ≺
P
(β, α)| + |S ./P(β, α)|.
For a preference profileP and a voting scheme s, if outcome β does not s dominate outcome α, we denote this by
β 6sP α. An outcome α is s optimal inP , if for all β , α, it holds that β 6sP α, while α is s optimum inP , if for all
β , α, it holds that α sP β. Note that optimum outcomes, if they exist, are unique.180
2.2. CP-nets
We now focus on CP-nets, which is the preference representation that we will more closely investigate in this work.
As mentioned in the introduction, the set of outcomes of a preference relation is often defined as the Cartesian product
of finite value domains for each of a set of features. Conditional preference nets (CP-nets) [11] are a formalism to
encode conditional ceteris paribus preferences over such combinatorial domains. The distinctive element of CP-nets is185
that a directed graph, whose vertices represent the features of a combinatorial domain, is used to intuitively model the
conditional part of conditional ceteris paribus preference statements. Below, we recall the syntax, semantics, and some
properties of CP-nets; see Section 6.1 for more on conditional ceteris paribus preferences and preference representations
in general.
Syntax of CP-nets. A CP-net N is a triple 〈GN ,DomN , (CPTFN)F∈FN 〉, where GN = 〈FN ,EN〉 is a directed graph whose190
vertices FN represent the features of a combinatorial domain, and DomN and (CPTFN)F∈FN are a function and a family
of functions, respectively. The function DomN associates a (value) domain DomN(F) with every feature F, while the
functions CPTFN are the CP tables for every feature F, which are defined below. The value domain of a feature F is
the set of all values that F may assume in the possible outcomes. In this paper, we assume features to be binary, i.e.,
the domain of each feature F contains exactly two values, usually denoted f and f , and called the overlined and the195
non-overlined value (of F), respectively. For a set of features S, DomN(S) = ×F∈SDomN(F) denotes the Cartesian
product of the domains of the features in S. Thus, an outcome is an element of ON = DomN(FN). Given a feature F
and an outcome α, we denote by α[F] the value of F in α, while, given a set of features F , α[F ] is the projection
of α over F . For two outcomes α and β, and a set of features F , we denote by α[F ] = β[F ] that α[F] = β[F] for
all F ∈ F ; we write α[F ] , β[F ], when this is not the case, i.e., when there is at least one feature F ∈ F such that200
α[F] , β[F]. The CP tables encode preferences over feature values. Intuitively, the CP table of a feature F specifies
how the values of the parent features of F influence the preferences over the values of F. More formally, for a feature
F, we denote by ParN(F) = {G ∈ FN | 〈G, F〉 ∈ EN} the set of all features in GN from which there is an edge to F. We
call ParN(F) the set of the parents of F (in N). We denote by OrdN(F) the set of all the (strict) preference rankings over
the elements of DomN(F). Each function CPTFN : DomN(ParN(F))→ OrdN(F) maps every element of DomN(ParN(F))205
to a (strict) preference ranking over the domain of F. If ParN(F) =∅, then CPTFN is a single (strict) preference ranking
over DomN(F). Note that indifferences between feature values are not admitted in (classical) CP-nets. Each function
1More formally, a profile is a multi-set, because different agents may have the very same preference relation.
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CPTFN is represented via a two-column table, in which, given a row, the element in the first column is the input value of
the function CPTFN , and the element in the second column is the associated (strict) preference ranking over DomN(F).
Since CPTFN is total, in the table representing the function, there is a row for any combination of values of the parent210
features, i.e., for a feature F, there are 2|DomN (ParN (F))| rows in the table of F.
In the following, when we define CP tables, we often use a logical notation to identify for which specific values
of the parent features, a particular row in the CP table has to be considered. Although this is the notation on which
generalized propositional CP-nets [33] are based on, it is used here only for notational convenience. In this paper, we
always assume that CP tables are explicitly represented in the input instances. In the CP tables, f  f denotes f being215
preferred to f . We denote by ‖N‖ the size of CP-net N, i.e., the space in terms of bits required to represent the whole
net N (which includes features, edges, feature domains, and CP tables).
Semantics of CP-nets. The preference semantics of CP-nets can be defined in several different but equivalent ways [11].
A first definition has a model-theoretic flavour [11, Definitions 2 and 3]. Intuitively, a preference ranking R violates a
CP-net N, if there are two outcomes α and β that according to the CP tables of N should be ranked β  α, but they220
are not ranked in such a way in R (i.e., α R β, since R is total). Formally, a preference ranking R violates a CP-net
N, if there are two distinct outcomes α, β and a feature F such that α[FN \ {F}] = β[FN \ {F}] (i.e., α and β differ
only on the value of F), β[F]  α[F] in the order CPTFN(α[ParN(F)]), and α R β. A preference ranking R satisfies a
CP-net N, if R does not violate N. Given two outcomes α and β, a CP-net N entails the preference α  β, denoted
N |= α  β, if α R β for every preference ranking R over ON that satisfies N. The preference semantics of CP-nets can225
be equivalently defined via the concept of improving (or alternatively worsening) flip [11, Definition 4]: let F be a
feature, and let α be an outcome. Intuitively, flipping the value of F in α from α[F] to a different one is an improving
flip, if the new value of F is preferred, given the values in α of the parent features of F. More formally, flipping F
from α[F] to a different value f ′ is an improving flip, if f ′  α[F] holds in CPTFN(α[ParN(F)]). Given two outcomes α
and β differing only on the value of a feature F, there is an improving flip from α to β, denoted α −→N[F] β, if flipping230
the value of F from α[F] to β[F] is an improving flip. In the following, we often omit the feature F and simply write
α →N β; and when we say that we flip a feature, then we often mean that the flipping is improving. The induced
preference graph of N is the pair GN = 〈VN , EN〉, where the nodes VN are all the possible outcomes of N, and, given
two outcomes α, β ∈ VN , the directed edge from α to β belongs to EN if and only if α→N β.
It can be shown that, for a CP-net N and two outcomes α and β, N |= β  α if and only if there is a sequence of235
improving flips from α to β [11, Theorems 7 and 8]. Therefore, for an agent whose preferences are encoded through
a CP-net N, we say that the agent prefers β to α, or that β dominates α (in N), denoted β N α, if N entails β  α,
or, equivalently, if there is an improving flipping sequence from α to β. If for two outcomes α and β, neither α N β
nor β N α, then α and β are incomparable (in N), denoted α ./N β (which is equivalent to the existence of preference
rankings R1 and R2 that both satisfy N such that α R1 β and β R2 α).240
Note here that, since there are no indifferences between features values in (classical) CP-nets, for any two outcomes α
and β, either one dominates the other, or they are incomparable.
Example 2.1. Consider the CP-net N shown in Figure 4. For the outcomes α = abc and β = abc, it holds that β N α,
because α −→N[A] β. For the outcomes α = abc and β = abc, it holds that β 6N α, because there is no path from α to β
in GN . However, α N β, because β −→N[C] α, and hence it is not the case that α ./N β. Consider now the outcomes245
α = abc and β = abc. Then, β N α by the improving flipping sequence abc→ abc→ abc→ abc. C
Properties of CP-nets. A CP-net is binary, if all its features are binary. The indegree of a CP-net N is the maximum
number of edges entering in a node of the graph of N. A CP-net N is singly connected, if, for any two distinct features G
and F, there is at most one path from G to F in GN . A classF of CP-nets is polynomially connected, if there exists a
polynomial p such that, for any CP-net N ∈ F and for any two features G and F of N, there are at most p(‖N‖) distinct250
paths from G to F in GN . A CP-net N is acyclic, if GN is acyclic. It is well known that acyclic CP-nets N always have
a preference ranking satisfying N, their induced preference graph GN is acyclic, the preferences encoded by N are
consistent (i.e., there is no outcome α such that α N α), and there is a unique optimum outcome oN dominating all
other outcomes (and not dominated by any other), which can be computed in polynomial time [11].
It is known that dominance testing, i.e., deciding, for any two given outcomes α and β, whether β  α, is in NP over255
polynomially connected classes of binary acyclic CP-nets [11]. However, it is an open problem whether dominance
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(a) A CP-net N with three features.
(b) The CP-net’s induced preference graph GN .
Figure 4: A CP-net and its induced preference graph.
testing is in NP over non-polynomially-connected classes of binary acyclic CP-nets. Allen’s conjecture [2, 4] states
that in general binary acyclic CP-nets, if an outcome α dominates an outcome β, then the length of the shortest
flipping sequence from β to α is O(n2), where n is the number of features in the CP-net. Also, the complexity of
dominance testing for non-binary CP-nets is currently still open. Whereas dominance testing for the class of acyclic260
binary singly connected CP-nets whose indegree is at most six is NP-hard [11]—we improve this result in Section 3,
requiring only indegree three. Dominance testing can be carried out in polynomial time on acyclic binary CP-nets
whose graph is a tree or a polytree [11]. For an extension of CP-nets, called generalized CP-nets, dominance testing is
PSPACE-complete [33].
In the rest of this paper, we consider only binary acyclic (and often polynomially connected) classes of CP-nets.265
When the CP-net N is clear from the context, we often omit the subscript “N” from the notations introduced above.
2.3. mCP-nets
In this section, we focus on mCP-nets [71], which are a formalism to reason about conditional ceteris paribus
preferences when a group of multiple agents is considered. Intuitively, an mCP-net is a profile of m (individual) CP-nets,
one for each agent of the group. The original definition of mCP-nets also allows for partial CP-nets. Here, we consider270
only mCP-nets consisting of a collection of standard CP-nets. The difference is that we do not allow for non-ranked
features in agents’ CP-nets, and hence there is no distinction between private, shared, and visible features (see the work
of Rossi et al. [71] for definitions), i.e., all features are ranked in all the individual CP-nets of an mCP-net.
As underlined by Rossi et al. [71], the “m” of an mCP-net stands for multiple agents and also indicates that the
preferences of m agents are modeled, so a 3CP-net is an mCP-net with m = 3. Formally, an mCP-netM = 〈N1, . . . ,Nm〉275
consists of m CP-nets N1, . . . ,Nm, all of them defined over the same set of features, which, in turn, have the same
domains. IfM is an mCP-net, we denote by FM the set of all features ofM, and by DomM(F) the domain of feature F
inM. Given this notation, FNi = FM, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and DomNi (F) = DomM(F), for all features F ∈ FM and all
1 ≤ i ≤ m. Although the features of the individual CP-nets are the same, their graphical structures may be different,
i.e., the edges between the features in the various individual CP-nets may vary. We underline here that, unlike in other280
papers in the literature, we do not impose that the individual CP-nets of the agents share a common topological order
(i.e., we do not restrict the profiles of CP-nets to be O-legal); see Section 6 for more on O-legality.
An outcome for an mCP-net is an assignment to all the features of the CP-nets, and given an mCP-netM, we
denote by OM the set of all the outcomes inM. The preference semantics of mCP-nets is defined through global voting
over CP-nets. In particular, via its own individual CP-net, each agent votes whether an outcome dominates another,285
and hence different ways of collecting votes (i.e., different voting schemes) give rise to different group dominance
semantics for an mCP-net. LetM = 〈N1, . . . ,Nm〉 be an mCP-net, and let α and β be two outcomes. With a notation
similar to the one defined above, S M(α, β) = {i | α Ni β}, S ≺M(α, β) = {i | α ≺Ni β}, and S ./M(α, β) = {i | α ./Ni β} are
the sets of the agents ofM preferring α to β, preferring β to α, and for which α and β are incomparable, respectively.
Rossi et al. [71] and Li et al. [59] proposed and analyzed various voting schemes to define multi-agent dominance290
semantics for mCP-nets. In this paper, we focus on two of them, namely, Pareto and majority voting, whose dominance
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semantics definitions are the natural specializations to mCP-nets of Pareto and majority dominance semantics defined
above.
An mCP-net is acyclic, binary, and singly connected, if all its CP-nets are acyclic, binary, and singly connected,
respectively. A classF of mCP-nets is polynomially connected, if the set of CP-nets constituting the mCP-nets inF is295
a polynomially connected class of CP-nets. The indegree of an mCP-net is the maximum indegree of its constituent
individual CP-nets. Unless stated otherwise, we consider only polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary
mCP-nets. When the mCP-netM is clear from the context, we often omit the subscript “M” from the above notations.
2.4. Computational complexity
We now give some notions from computational complexity theory, which will be required for the complexity300
analysis carried out in this paper. First, we briefly recall the complexity classes that we will encounter in this paper
(along with some closely related ones), and then we recall the notion of polynomial-time reductions among decision
problems, and some decision problems that are hard for some of these complexity classes. We assume that the reader
has some elementary background in computational complexity theory, including the notions of Boolean formulas and
quantified Boolean formulas, Turing machines, and hardness and completeness of a problem for a complexity class, as305
can be found, e.g., in the works of Johnson [47] and Papadimitriou [67].
Complexity classes. The class P is the set of all decision problems that can be solved by a deterministic Turing machine
in polynomial time with respect to the input size, i.e., with respect to the length of the string that encodes the input
instance. For a given input string s, its size is usually denoted by ‖s‖. The class of decision problems that can be
solved by nondeterministic Turing machines in polynomial time is denoted by NP. They enjoy a remarkable property:310
any “yes”-instance s has a certificate for being a “yes”-instance, which has polynomial length and can be checked
in deterministic polynomial time (in ‖s‖). For example, deciding whether a Boolean formula φ(X) over the Boolean
variables X = {x1, . . . , xn} is satisfiable, i.e., whether there exists some truth assignment to these variables making φ true,
is a well-known problem in NP; in fact, any satisfying truth assignment for φ is a certificate that φ is a “yes”-instance,
i.e., that φ is satisfiable.315
For a complexity class C, we denote by co-C the complementary class to C, i.e., the class containing the comple-
mentary languages of those in C. For example, the problem of deciding whether a Boolean formula φ is not satisfiable
is in co-NP. The class P is contained in both NP and co-NP, i.e., P ⊆ NP ∩ co-NP.
By LOGSPACE, we denote the set of decision problems that can be solved by deterministic Turing machines in
logarithmic space. For such machines, it is assumed that the input tape is read-only, and that these machine have a320
read/write tape, called work tape, for intermediate computations. The logarithmic space bound is given on the space
available on the work tape. The class LOGSPACE is contained in P.
The class DP, defined originally by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [68], is the class of problems that are a
“conjunction” of two problems, one from NP and one from co-NP, i.e., DP = {L | L = L′ ∩ L′′, L′ ∈ NP, L′′ ∈ co-NP}.
The class co-DP is the class of problems whose complements are in DP, equivalently, it can be defined as the class325
of problems that are a “disjunction” of two problems, one from NP and one from co-NP, i.e., co-DP = {L | L =
L′ ∪ L′′, L′ ∈ NP, L′′ ∈ co-NP}.
The classes ΣPk , Π
P
k , and ∆
P
k , for all k ≥ 0, constituting the polynomial hierarchy (PH) [78], are defined as follows:
ΣP0 = Π
P
0 = ∆
P
0 = P, and, for all k ≥ 1, ΣPk = NPΣ
P
k−1 , ∆Pk = P
ΣPk−1 , and ΠPk = co-Σ
P
k . Here, Σ
P
k (resp., ∆
P
k ) is the set
of decision problems solvable by nondeterministic (resp., deterministic) polynomial-time Turing machines with an330
oracle to recognize, at unit cost, a language in ΣPk−1. Note that Σ
P
1 = NP
ΣP0 = NPP = NP, ΠP1 = co-Σ
P
0 = co-NP, and
∆P1 = P
ΣP0 = PP = P. Sometimes a bound is imposed on the number of calls that are allowed to be issued to the oracle.
For example, ΘPk = P
ΣPk−1[O(log n)] denotes the set of decision problems solvable by a deterministic polynomial-time
Turing machine that is allowed to query a ΣPk−1 oracle at most logarithmically many times (in the size of the input). By
definition, ΘPk ⊆ ∆Pk .2335
2For the complexity class ΘPk , an interesting characterization has recently been provided: Θ
P
k is the class of languages involving the counting and
comparison of the number of “yes”-instances in two sets containing instances of ΣPk−1 or Π
P
k−1 languages [62]. This is quite useful for reductions in
voting settings where votes have to be counted and compared.
9
Figure 5: Inclusion relationships among complexity classes: an arrow from class C′ to class C′′ means that C′ ⊆ C′′.
The classes DP and co-DP can be generalized to the classes DPk = {L | L = L′ ∩ L′′, L′ ∈ ΣPk , L′′ ∈ ΠPk } and
co-DPk = {L | L = L′ ∪ L′′, L′ ∈ ΣPk , L′′ ∈ ΠPk }, respectively, for k ≥ 1, that are the conjunction and the disjunction,
respectively, of ΣPk and Π
P
k ; in particular, D
P
1 = D
P. Note also that DPk ⊆ ΘPk+1.
Given their definitions, for all k ≥ 1, the relationships among the mentioned classes are as follows (see Figure 5 for
an illustration): (ΣPk ∪ ΠPk ) ⊆ DPk , co-DPk ⊆ ΘPk+1 ⊆ ∆Pk+1 ⊆ (ΣPk+1 ∩ ΠPk+1) (see, e.g., the works by Wagner [79, 80]).340
PSPACE is the class of decision problems that can be solved by deterministic Turing machines in polynomial space.
Similarly to LOGSPACE machines, PSPACE machines have a read-only input tape and a read/write work tape. The
polynomial space bound is issued over the space used on the work tape. The class PSPACE contains PH.
The class EXPTIME includes all the decision problems that can be solved by deterministic Turing machines in
exponential time. The class EXPTIME contains PSPACE.345
A transducer is a (possibly non-deterministic) Turing machine T on the alphabet Σ with a read-only input tape, a
read/write work tape, and a write-only output tape. For any string x ∈ Σ∗, we say that T accepts x, if T has an accepting
computation path on x. For each x ∈ Σ∗ accepted by T , we denote by T (x) the set of all strings that are written by T
on the output tape in its accepting computation paths on the input string x. Thus, every transducer is associated with
some multi-valued function f (we say that T computes f ) such that, for each x ∈ Σ∗, f (x) = T (x), if x is accepted by T ;350
otherwise, f is undefined at x (i.e., x < dom( f )).
A function f is computable in (deterministic) polynomial time, if there is a deterministic transducer computing f in
polynomial time. We denote by FP the class of all functions computable in deterministic polynomial time. A function
f is computable in (deterministic) logarithmic space, if there is a deterministic transducer computing f and using no
more than logarithmic space on its work tape.355
Reductions and hard problems. A decision problem L1 is (Karp) reducible, or many-one reducible, to a decision
problem L2, denoted L1 ≤ L2, if there is a computable function h, called (Karp/many-one) reduction, such that, for
every string s, h(s) is defined, and s is a “yes”-instance of L1 if and only if h(s) is a “yes”-instance of L2. A decision
problem L1 is polynomially (Karp/many-one) reducible to a decision problem L2, denoted L1 ≤p L2, if there is a
polynomial-time (Karp/many-one) reduction from L1 to L2. In this paper, we consider only Karp/many-one reductions.360
To prove hardness for a problem in a complexity class, we show reductions from various problems known to be
complete for the complexity classes that they belong to. We next define such problems, so that we can later refer to
them by name.
Deciding the satisfiability of Boolean formulas, denoted Sat, is the prototypical NP-complete problem, which
remains NP-hard even if only 3CNF formulas are considered [32, 48], i.e., Boolean formulas in conjunctive normal365
form with three literals per clause. The complementary problem Unsat of deciding whether a given Boolean formula
is not satisfiable is co-NP-complete. It remains co-NP-hard even if only 3CNF formulas are considered, and it is the
equivalent to the problem Taut of deciding whether a 3DNF formula is a tautology. A 3DNF formula is a Boolean
formula in disjunctive normal form with three literals per term. CNF and DNF formulas are actually linked, and
formulas in one form can be transformed into the other form via De Morgan’s laws, and in some cases via a process370
called dualization [34, 35]. These transformations are useful when we prefer formulas in a specific form rather than the
other (see the discussion below). Transforming formulas can however yield, in some circumstances, an exponential
growth in the size of the transformed formulas.
The prototypical ΣPk - and Π
P
k -complete QBFQ1,k problems are defined as follows: given a quantified Boolean for-
mula (QBF) Φ = (Q1X1)(Q2X2) . . . (QkXk)φ(X1, X2, . . . , Xk), where375
• Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qk is a sequence of k alternating quantifiers Qi ∈ {∃,∀}, and
• φ(X1, X2, . . . , Xk) is a (non-quantified) Boolean formula over k disjoint sets X1, X2, . . . , Xk of Boolean variables,
decide whether the formula Φ is valid. The problem QBF∃,k is ΣPk -complete [78, 81], while QBF∀,k is Π
P
k -complete [78,
81]. These problems remain hard for their respective classes even if φ(X1, X2, . . . , Xk) is in 3CNF, when Qk = ∃, and if
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φ(X1, X2, . . . , Xk) is in 3DNF, when Qk = ∀ [78, 81]. We denote by QBFCNFk,∃ (resp., QBFDNFk,∀ )3 the problem of deciding380
the validity of formulas Φ = (Q1X1) . . . (QkXk)φ(X1, . . . , Xk), where Qk is ∃ (resp., ∀), and φ(X1, . . . , Xk) is in 3CNF
(resp., 3DNF). For odd k, QBFCNFk,∃ (resp., QBF
DNF
k,∀ ) is complete for Σ
P
k (resp., Π
P
k ), while, for even k, QBF
CNF
k,∃ (resp.,
QBFDNFk,∀ ) is complete for Π
P
k (resp., Σ
P
k ). Observe that QBF
CNF
1,∃ (resp., QBF
DNF
1,∀ ) is equivalent to Sat (resp., Taut).
Sometimes, it is preferable that in QBF formulas the non-quantified formula is CNF rather than DNF, or vice-versa.
For example, to show ΣP2-hardness it might be the case that we would prefer to start our reduction from formulas385
Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)φ(X,Y) with φ(X,Y) being in CNF, rather than in DNF, as required by QBFDNF2,∀ . To achieve this, we
can exploit De Morgan’s laws. Indeed, we have that Φ = (Q1X1) . . . (QkXk)φ(X1, . . . , Xk) is logically equivalent to
Φ′ = (Q1X1) . . . (QkXk)¬φ′(X1, . . . , Xk), where φ′(X1, . . . , Xk) = ¬φ(X1, . . . , Xk). We thus extend the notation above.
We denote by QBFDNFk,∃,¬ (resp., QBF
CNF
k,∀,¬) the problem of deciding the validity of formulas Φ = (Q1X1) . . . (QkXk)
¬φ(X1, . . . , Xk), where Qk is ∃ (resp., ∀), and φ(X1, . . . , Xk) is in 3DNF (resp., 3CNF). For odd k, QBFDNFk,∃,¬ (resp.,390
QBFCNFk,∀,¬) is complete for Σ
P
k (resp., Π
P
k ), while, for even k, QBF
DNF
k,∃,¬ (resp., QBF
CNF
k,∀,¬) is complete for Π
P
k (resp., Σ
P
k ).
2.5. A framework for preference representation schemes
In this paper, most of the membership results that we will show hold for generic preference representation schemes.
For this reason, we now introduce the general framework of representation schemes that we will refer to. Inspired
by the concept of compact representations introduced by Chevaleyre et al. [22], Greco et al. [40, 42], and Lang and395
Xia [55], we define preference representation schemes S as suitable encodings for a class of preference relations,
denoted C(S ). Formally, a preference representation schemeS defines a computable representation function ξS (·)
and a computable Boolean function PrefS (·, ·, ·) such that, for any relation R ∈ C(S ), ξS (R) is the encoding of R
according toS , and PrefS (ξS (R), α, β) evaluates to 1, if 〈α, β〉 ∈ R (i.e., if α R β), and to 0, otherwise. By ‖ξS (R)‖,
we denote the size of the representation of R viaS .400
LetS1 andS2 be two preference representation schemes. We say thatS2 is at least as expressive (and succinct)
asS1, denotedS1 -e S2, if there exists a function f in FP (i.e., computable in deterministic polynomial time) that
translates any preference relation ξS1 (R) represented inS1 into an equivalent preference relation ξS2 (R) represented
inS2, i.e., into a preference relation over the same outcomes and with the same preference relationships between them.
More precisely, we require that ξS2 (R) = f (ξS1 (R)) and PrefS1 (ξS1 (R), α, β) = PrefS2 (ξS2 (R), α, β), for each pair of405
outcomes α and β. Observe that f belonging to FP entails that there exists a constant c f (depending on f ) such that
‖ξS2 (R)‖ ≤ ‖ξS1 (R)‖c f , i.e., the size of ξS2 (R) is polynomially bounded in the size of ξS1 (R).4
A P- and an NP-representation S is a preference representation scheme whose function PrefS is in P and
NP, respectively. For example, the polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary CP-nets are NP-representation
schemes [11].410
When a compact representationS is clear from the context, we often simply write R instead of ξS (R), and α R β
and α 6R β instead of PrefS (ξS (R), α, β) = 1 and PrefS (ξS (R), α, β) = 0, respectively. While doing so, we are
identifying the preference relation with its actual representation.
3. Complexity of basic tasks on CP-nets
To precisely characterize the complexity of Pareto and majority voting tasks in Sections 4 and 5, we need to415
understand the complexity of deciding, given a CP-net N and two outcomes α and β, whether α dominates β or whether
α and β are incomparable. Here, we prove that the former problem is NP-complete, while the latter is co-NP-complete.
To achieve this, after giving some preliminary definitions on how to encode Boolean formulas into CP-nets, we show
that deciding the satisfiability of Boolean formula can be reduced to the problem of deciding dominance between
outcomes in CP-nets. This allows us to prove the NP-hardness of the dominance test in CP-nets and the co-NP-hardness420
3Note the difference in the subscripts of the notations QBFQ1 ,k and QBF
CNF
k,Qk
(resp., QBFDNFk,Qk ). In the former notation, Q1 is the first quantifier of
the sequence, and, for notational convenience, we place “Q1” before “k” in the subscript. On the other hand, in the latter notation, Qk is the last
quantifier of the sequence, and, for notational convenience, we place “Qk” after “k” in the subscript.
4Note that the above definitions are slightly different from the ones by Lang and Xia [55]: the counterpart of this paper’s function Pref in [55]
is not required to be computable, and the transformation function f in [55] is only required to be polynomially bounded, but not polynomially
computable.
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Figure 6: The CP-net F(φ), where φ(x1, x2, x3, x4) = (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (¬x2 ∨ x3 ∨ ¬x4). Not all the CP tables are reported in the figure.
of deciding incomparability is shown as a byproduct of this property. The NP-hardness of dominance in CP-nets was
already proven by Boutilier et al. [11]. Here, we show this result, because the construction proposed here, which also
allows us to prove a stricter result, is different from the one available in the literature, and it is required in multiple
reductions in the rest of the paper.
3.1. Preliminaries425
We first introduce a notation mapping Boolean assignments to outcomes of CP-nets; this notation will frequently be
used later in the paper. In particular, to prove the hardness of voting tasks on mCP-nets, we often provide reductions
from problems regarding the satisfiability (or validity) of (quantified) Boolean formulas. For this reason, mCP-nets will
often have sets of features associated with sets of Boolean variables. For example, for a Boolean formula φ(X) over
the set of Boolean variables X = {x1, . . . , xn}, we often define an mCP-netM(φ) that hasV = ⋃{{VTi ,VFi } | xi ∈ X}430
as a subset of its set of features. Then, for a (partial or complete) assignment σX over X, an outcome ασX ofM(φ)
encoding σX over the features set V is such that, for the features in V, if σX[xi] = true, then ασX [VTi VFi ] = vTi vFi ;
if σX[xi] = false, then ασX [V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i ; and if σX[xi] is undefined, then ασX [V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i . The values of the
features F < V in ασX will be specified in each particular case.
We next define formula nets, which will be used in hardness proofs, and which are intuitively CP-nets aiming at435
having a particular preference relationship between two outcomes depending on the satisfiability of associated Boolean
formulas in CNF. This will allow us to show that deciding dominance in CP-nets is NP-hard.
Formally, let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over the set of Boolean variables X = {x1, . . . , xn}, and
whose set of clauses is C = {c1, . . . , cm}. We often omit the variable set from the notation of the Boolean formula, i.e.,
we write φ instead of φ(X), if this does not cause ambiguity. We denote by ` j,k the k-th literal of the j-th clause. From440
φ(X), we build the CP-net F(φ) in the following way (see Figure 6 for an example). The features of F(φ) are:
• for each variable xi ∈ X, there are features VTi and VFi (called variable features), and we denote byVφ the set of
variable features;
• for each clause c j ∈ C, there is a feature D j (called clause feature), and we denote by Dφ the set of clause
features; and445
• for each literal ` j,k, there is a feature P j,k (called literal feature), and we denote by Pφ the set of literal features.
All features are binary, with the usual notation for their values. When the formula φ is clear from the context, we often
omit the subscript “φ” from the notation of the sets of features illustrated above. The edges of F(φ) are: for each literal
` j,k = xi or ` j,k = ¬xi, there are edges 〈VTi , P j,k〉, 〈VFi , P j,k〉, and 〈P j,k,D j〉. The CP tables of F(φ) are:
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• for each variable xi ∈ X, features VTi and VFi have the CP tables450
vTi  vTi and vFi  vFi , respectively;
• for each literal ` j,k, if ` j,k = xi, then feature P j,k has the CP table
vTi ∧ vFi p j,k  p j,k
else p j,k  p j,k ;
otherwise (i.e., ` j,k = ¬xi) P j,k has the CP table
vTi ∧ vFi p j,k  p j,k
else p j,k  p j,k ;455
• for each clause c j ∈ C, feature D j has the CP table
p j,1 ∨ p j,2 ∨ p j,3 d j  d j
else d j  d j .
Note that F(φ) is binary, acyclic, singly connected, its indegree is three, and the CP-net can be built in polynomial
time in the size of φ.
The following lemma and corollary show an important property of formula nets, which is that φ is satisfiable if and460
only if a particular outcome dominates others in F(φ).
Lemma 3.1. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over a set X of Boolean variables, and let σX be an
assignment on X. Let ασX be the outcome of F(φ) encoding σX on the feature set V, and assigning non-overlined
values to all other features, and let β be the outcome assigning overlined values to all and only variable and clause
features. Then:465
(1) There is an extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β F(φ) ασX ;
(2) There is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β ./F(φ) ασX .
Proof (sketch). The idea at the base of this proof is that the CP tables in F(φ) are designed so that the features enact the
role of variables, literals, and clauses of a CNF Boolean formula. Details of the proof are at page 35.
Corollary 3.2. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over a set X of Boolean variables, and let α and β be470
two outcomes of OF(φ) assigning non-overlined values to all features and overlined values to all and only variable and
clause features, respectively. Then:
• φ is satisfiable if and only if β F(φ) α;
• φ is unsatisfiable if and only if β ./F(φ) α.
Proof. Observe that, when the empty assignment σX is considered, outcomes ασX and βσX of the statement of475
Lemma 3.1 coincide with outcomes α and β of the statement of this corollary, respectively. Moreover, any assignment
over X is an extension of the empty one, and hence Lemma 3.1 applies.
3.2. Complexity of dominance, incomparability, and optimality on CP-nets
As mentioned above, via formula nets, it is possible to show the NP-hardness and the co-NP-hardness of dominance
and incomparability on CP-nets, respectively. We start by showing the NP-hardness of dominance on CP-nets. More480
formally, consider the following problem on CP-nets.
Problem: Dominance
Instance: A CP-net N, and two outcomes α, β ∈ ON .
Question: Is β N α?
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Dominance is known to be in NP for some classes of instances, and in particular it is in NP for polynomially
connected classes of acyclic binary CP-nets [11]. For these classes of CP-nets, it was shown that Dominance is NP-hard,
and hardness holds even if the considered CP-nets are singly connected and the indegree of each feature in the net is at485
most six [11]. Moreover, Dominance can be carried out in polynomial time on acyclic binary CP-nets whose graph is a
tree or a polytree (which means that the graph obtained by making undirected the edges of the graph of the CP-net is
acyclic) [11]. However, the exact complexity of Dominance for general (non polynomially connected classes of) acyclic
binary CP-nets is still an open problem [11], and in particular it is unknown whether it belongs to NP or not. Allen [2]
and Allen et al. [4] conjectured that in general binary acyclic CP-nets, if an outcome α dominates an outcome β, then490
the length of the shortest flipping sequence from β to α is O(n2), where n is the number of features in the CP-net. If this
were the case, then dominance testing would be in NP also for binary acyclic CP-nets.
First, we give an improved result on the hardness of dominance testing in CP-nets. In particular, we show that the
NP-hardness holds even if the indegree of the CP-net is three, while the minimum indegree previously required to show
the hardness was six [11].495
Theorem 3.3 (improved over [11]). Let N be a CP-net, and let α, β ∈ ON be two outcomes. Deciding whether β N α
is NP-hard. Hardness holds even if N is acyclic, binary, singly connected, and its indegree is three.
Proof. To show that Dominance is NP-hard, we prove that Sat ≤p Dominance. Let φ be a Boolean formula in 3CNF.
Consider the CP-net F(φ) (defined in Section 3.1) and outcomes α and β such that in α the values of all features are
non-overlined, and in β the values of all and only variable and clause features are overlined. By Corollary 3.2, φ is500
satisfiable if and only if β F(φ) α.
We now focus on the problem of testing incomparability between outcomes in CP-nets and show its co-NP-com-
pleteness. We show hardness via the properties of formula nets. More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Incomparability
Instance: A CP-net N, and two outcomes α, β ∈ ON .
Question: Is α ./N β?
The following theorem shows that deciding whether two outcomes are incomparable in a preference relation505
represented via an NP-representation scheme is in co-NP.
Theorem 3.4. Let R be a preference relation represented via an NP-representation scheme, and let α and β be two
outcomes. Deciding whether α ./R β is in co-NP.
Proof. We show that disproving α ./ β is in NP. In fact, if α 6./ β, then either α  β or β  α. In these cases, since R is
represented via an NP-representation, there is a polynomial certificate either witnessing α  β or witnessing β  α. To510
conclude, observe that such a certificate can be checked in polynomial time.
We now focus on CP-nets and show that deciding incomparability is co-NP-hard.
Theorem 3.5. Let N be a CP-net, and let α and β be two outcomes. Deciding whether α ./N β is co-NP-hard. Hardness
holds even if N is acyclic, binary, singly connected, and its indegree is three.
Proof. To show that Incomparability is co-NP-hard, we prove that Unsat ≤p Incomparability. Let φ be a Boolean515
formula in 3CNF. Consider the CP-net F(φ) (defined in Section 3.1) and outcomes α and β such that in α the values
of all features are non-overlined, and in β the values of all and only variable and clause features are overlined. By
Corollary 3.2, φ is unsatisfiable if and only if α ./F(φ) β.
By combining the previous two results, we obtain that testing incomparability over polynomially connected classes
of acyclic CP-nets is co-NP-complete.520
Corollary 3.6. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic CP-nets. Let N ∈ C be a CP-net, and let α and β be
two outcomes. Deciding whether α ./N β is co-NP-complete.
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We emphasize here that checking the incomparability between two outcomes is different from deciding the “ordering
query” defined by Boutilier et al. [11]. For a CP-net N and two outcomes α and β, an ordering query is deciding
whether there is at least a preference raking R satisfying N such that α R β. As noticed by Boutilier et al. [11], this is525
tantamount to deciding whether N 6|= β  α. Since N 6|= β  α if and only if β 6N α, deciding an ordering query is
actually co-NP-hard, because dominance testing is NP-hard. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the polynomial
algorithm proposed by Boutilier et al. [11] to decide ordering queries is actually “partially complete” (as said by
[11]). In fact, given the co-NP-hardness of the ordering query problem, there is no sound and complete deterministic
polynomial-time algorithm for this problem (unless a major breakthrough in complexity theory occurs, showing that530
P = NP).
We conclude this section by looking at the complexity of deciding whether an outcome is optimal in a CP-net. This
result is needed in Section 4 to characterize the complexity of one of the voting tasks of Pareto voting. Here, we show
that this problem can be decided in LOGSPACE. More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Optimality-Testing
Instance: A CP-net N, and an outcome α ∈ ON .
Question: Is α optimal in N?
535
Recall that for acyclic CP-nets, there is an outcome that is optimum [11]. This outcome is also the only optimal
one in a CP-net. Therefore, checking whether an outcome is optimal is tantamount to checking whether the outcome
is optimum. It was shown that, given an acyclic CP-net N, computing the unique optimal outcome oN of N can be
carried out in deterministic polynomial time, more precisely in linear time, through the “forward sweep” procedure [11].
Hence, as pointed out by Rossi et al. [71], a simple procedure to decide whether a given outcome α is optimal in an540
acyclic CP-net N is to compute oN (in polynomial time) and then to compare α to oN . However, this problem actually
belongs to a complexity class that is a below P when acyclic CP-nets are considered.
Theorem 3.7. Let N be an acyclic CP-net, and let α ∈ ON be an outcome. Deciding whether α is optimal in N is in
LOGSPACE.
Proof. As N is acyclic, if an outcome α is not optimal in N, then there is an improving flipping sequence from α to the545
optimum outcome, and hence there is at least a feature whose value can be flipped in α to obtain a better outcome.
Therefore, to decide whether α is optimal, it suffices to consider in turn all features F and check whether it is possible
to perform an improving flip according to the CP table of F. If no feature can be flipped to improve the outcome, then α
is optimal. This procedure requires only logarithmic space to be carried out.
Now that we have analyzed the complexity of dominance, incomparability, and optimality in CP-nets, we can550
devote our focus to the complexity of Pareto and majority voting on CP-nets in the next two sections.
4. Complexity of Pareto voting on mCP-nets
In this section, we characterize the complexity of Pareto voting tasks on mCP-nets. In particular, after giving some
preliminaries on specific structures of CP-nets that we will use in our reductions, we analyze the complexity of Pareto
dominance, which is proven NP-complete. Then, we devote our analysis to the problems related to Pareto optimal555
outcomes, namely, deciding whether an outcome is Pareto optimal, and deciding whether an mCP-net has a Pareto
optimal outcome. We prove the former co-NP-complete, while for the latter, we are able to show that every mCP-net
has a Pareto optimal outcome, which implies that the problem is trivial (i.e., can be answered in constant time). To
conclude, we study the complexity of problems on Pareto optimum outcomes, namely, deciding whether an outcome is
Pareto optimum, and deciding whether an mCP-net has a Pareto optimum outcome. Both problems are proven to be560
tractable, and in particular we show the former to be in LOGSPACE and the latter to be in P. We recall that the Pareto
voting semantics is based on the concept of unanimity, i.e., given an mCP-netM and two outcomes α, β ∈ OM, it holds
that β pM α, if all agents prefer β to α, i.e., |S M(β, α)| = m.
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Figure 7: An interconnecting net HC(9). Not all the CP tables are reported in the figure.
4.1. Preliminaries
We now introduce a specific structure of CP-nets that will be used in the forthcoming reductions. In particular, the565
conjunctive HC(·) and disjunctive HD(·) interconnecting nets are CP-nets whose role is intuitively to link different parts
of bigger CP-nets: given a set S of m features, the aim of the CP-nets HC(m) and HD(m) is to propagate the information
that all features of S and at least one of the features of S, respectively, have been flipped to their overlined value.
We first introduce the conjunctive interconnecting CP-net HC(m). See Figure 7 for an example of a HC(9) inter-
connecting net. Such a CP-net is partitioned into layers, and it is a kind of “inverted pyramid”. In particular, HC(m) is570
an acyclic DAG in which each feature of a layer has two or three distinct parents in the previous layer, and at most one
child in the next layer. Features belonging to the same layer have no parents in common, and in every layer at most one
feature has three parents. The first layer of HC(m) is attached to a set S of m different features of the CP-net that we
want to connect. In the first layer of HC(m), the above described connection properties hold relative to the features of
S. The layer with a unique feature, which we call apex, is the last layer of the CP-net. All the features of HC(m) are575
named Ai with a proper increasing index i (and they are distinct from the features in S), and their values are, as usual,
{ai, ai}. The CP table for a feature Ai states that value ai is preferred to ai whenever the value of every parent of Ai is
overlined. Otherwise, the value ai is preferred to ai. Let α be an outcome in which the values of all the features Ai
are non-overlined. It is not difficult to see that, whenever all the features in S have overlined values in α, there is an
improving flipping sequence starting from α changing the values of all Ai (and hence also the value of the apex) to their580
overlined values.
The disjunctive interconnecting net HD(m) is similar to HC(m). The features and the structure of HD(m) are the
same as those in HC(m). The only variations are on the CP tables. Since HD(m) is a disjunctive net, given a feature Ai
of HD(m), value ai is preferred to value ai, whenever at least one of the parents of Ai has been flipped to its overlined
value. Let α be an outcome in which the values of all the features Ai are non-overlined. It is easy to see that, whenever585
at least a feature in S has an overlined value in α, there is an improving flipping sequence starting from α and reaching
an outcome in which the apex has an overlined value.
Note that HC(m) and HD(m) are binary, acyclic, singly connected, their indegree is at most three, and the CP-nets
can be built in polynomial time in |S| = m, as the number of their features is polynomial in m (in particular, strictly less
than m), and each feature has a bounded number of parents which translates into CP tables of bounded sizes.590
4.2. Complexity of Pareto dominance on mCP-nets
First, we analyze the problem of deciding Pareto dominance on CP-nets, which is shown NP-complete. More
formally, consider the following problem.
16
Problem: Pareto-Dominance
Instance: An mCP-netM, and two outcomes α, β ∈ OM.
Question: Is β pM α?
The following theorem shows that deciding Pareto dominance over preference profiles represented via an NP-595
representation scheme is in NP.
Theorem 4.1. Let P be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via an
NP-representation scheme, and let α and β be two outcomes. Then, deciding whether β p
P
α is in NP.
Proof. To show that this problem resides in NP, we exhibit a concise certificate for it. Let P = 〈R1, . . . ,Rm〉. If
β p
P
α, then, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, it holds that β Ri α. Since, for every agent i, Ri is represented via an NP-representation600
scheme, there is a concise certificate witnessing that β Ri α. Therefore, in order to decide whether β pP α, it suffices
to guess and subsequently check the polynomial witnesses that, for each agent i, it holds that β Ri α. The overall
guess requires only polynomial space, and it can be checked in polynomial time.
Observe that on 1CP-nets, Pareto dominance is equivalent to dominance (on simple CP-nets). Therefore, the
following result, which follows directly from Theorem 3.3, shows that deciding Pareto dominance in mCP-nets is605
NP-hard.
Theorem 4.2. LetM be an mCP-net, and let α and β be two outcomes. Then, deciding whether β pM α is NP-hard.
Hardness holds even on classes of singly connected acyclic binary mCP-nets with indegree at most three and at most
one agent.
By combining the two previous results, we immediately obtain that Pareto dominance over polynomially connected610
classes of acyclic mCP-nets is NP-complete.
Corollary 4.3. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. LetM ∈ C be an mCP-net, and let α
and β be two outcomes. Then, deciding whether β pM α is NP-complete.
4.3. Complexity of Pareto optimality on mCP-nets
Here, we devote our analysis to problems on Pareto optimal outcomes. In particular, the problems analyzed are615
deciding whether an outcome is Pareto optimal, and deciding whether an mCP-net has a Pareto optimal outcome. We
first focus on deciding Pareto optimality of outcomes in mCP-nets. We show that this problem is co-NP-complete.
More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Is-Pareto-Optimal
Instance: An mCP-netM, and an outcome α ∈ OM.
Question: Is α Pareto optimal inM?
The following result shows that, for a preference profile represented via an NP-representation scheme, deciding the620
Pareto optimality of an outcome is in co-NP.
Theorem 4.4. Let P be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via an
NP-representation scheme, and let α be an outcome. Then, deciding whether α is Pareto optimal inP is in co-NP.
Proof. We show that disproving α being Pareto optimal is in NP. If α is not Pareto optimal in P , then there is an
outcome β such that β p
P
α. Therefore, we can guess such an outcome β along with the witness that β p
P
α. This625
guess requires only polynomial space and can be checked in polynomial time (see the proof of Theorem 4.1).
To prove the co-NP-hardness of Is-Pareto-Optimal, we use a reduction from Unsat. Consider the following
construction. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over the set of Boolean variables X = {x1, . . . , xn}, and
whose set of clauses is C = {c1, . . . , cm}. From φ, we build the 2CP-netMipo(φ) = 〈N ipo1 ,N ipo2 〉 in the following way.
The CP-nets N ipo1 and N
ipo
2 are built similarly, and we discuss first N
ipo
1 . See Figure 8 for a schematic representation of630
the interconnections between the building blocks of N ipo1 and N
ipo
2 .
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Figure 8: A schematic representation of the building blocks of the 2CP-netMipo(φ) = 〈Nipo1 ,Nipo2 〉.
In N ipo1 , there are two complete copies of the net F(φ) (defined in Section 3.1), with its features, edges, and CP
tables. To distinguish these two copies, we append two different superscript to them and obtain F(φ)a and F(φ)b. All
features of these two nets have the corresponding superscript a or b to make them different and distinguish them from
the others. The clause features of F(φ)a, i.e., D1a, . . . ,Dma, are attached to a conjunctive interconnecting net HC(m)635
(defined in Section 4.1). The apex A of HC(m) is attached to all the variable features of F(φ)b. Since the variable
features of F(φ)b now have one parent (more precisely the same parent, i.e., the apex of HC(m)), the CP tables of these
features are a bit different from those in F(φ). Variable features F of F(φ)b have the CP tables
a f  f
a f  f .
The CP-net N ipo2 is similar to N
ipo
1 , with the only difference that the conjunctive interconnecting CP-net HC(m)640
attaches the clause features of F(φ)b to the variable features of F(φ)a. The CP tables in N ipo2 of the variable features
of F(φ)a are therefore modified accordingly.
Observe that Mipo(φ) is acyclic, binary, its indegree is three, and can be computed in polynomial time from
φ. Moreover, the class of mCP-nets {Mipo(φ)}φ derived from formulas φ of the specified kind and according to the
reduction shown above is polynomially connected. The following result shows that φ(X) is satisfiable if and only if a645
particular outcome ofMipo(φ) is not Pareto optimal.
Lemma 4.5. Let φ(X) be a 3CNF Boolean formula, and let α be the outcome ofMipo(φ) assigning non-overlined
values to all features. Then, φ(X) is satisfiable if and only if α is not Pareto optimal inMipo(φ).
Proof (sketch). The key point of the proof is that the features of the formula net downline of the interconnecting net
can be flipped to their overlined values if and only if the formula φ is satisfiable. Details of the proof are at page 36.650
The above property implies that, in mCP-nets, deciding the Pareto optimality of an outcome is co-NP-hard.
Theorem 4.6. Let M be an mCP-net, and let α ∈ OM be an outcome. Deciding whether α is Pareto optimal is
co-NP-hard. Hardness holds even on polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary mCP-nets with indegree at most
three and at most two agents.
Proof. We prove that Is-Pareto-Optimal is co-NP-hard by showing a reduction from Unsat. Let φ(X) be a 3CNF655
formula, and consider the 2CP-netMipo(φ) = 〈N ipo1 ,N ipo2 〉. Consider the outcome α ∈ OMipo(φ) in which the values of all
features are non-overlined. By Lemma 4.5, φ(X) is unsatisfiable (and hence a “yes”-instance of Unsat) if and only if α
is Pareto optimal inMipo(φ).
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Notice here that the presence of at least two agents in an mCP-net is an essential source of complexity for the
problem Is-Pareto-Optimal. In fact, if there were only one agent, then deciding whether an outcome α is Pareto optimal660
would be tantamount to checking whether α is optimal for that only agent, and we have seen already that this task can
be carried out in LOGSPACE (see Theorem 3.7).
By combining the two above results, we immediately conclude that deciding the Pareto optimality of an outcome
over polynomially connected classes of acyclic mCP-nets is co-NP-complete.
Corollary 4.7. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. LetM ∈ C be an mCP-net, and let665
α ∈ OM be an outcome. Deciding whether α is Pareto optimal is co-NP-complete.
We now focus on the problem of deciding the existence of Pareto optimal outcomes in mCP-nets. We show that
every mCP-nets has a Pareto optimal outcome, which implies that the problem is trivial (i.e., can be answered in
constant time). More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Exists-Pareto-Optimal
Instance: An mCP-netM.
Question: DoesM have a Pareto optimal outcome?
670
The following lemma shows that an acyclic CP-net has always a Pareto optimal outcome.
Lemma 4.8. LetM be an acyclic mCP-net. Then,M has (always) a Pareto optimal outcome.
Proof. LetM = 〈N1, . . . ,Nm〉 be an mCP-net, and assume by contradiction thatM has no Pareto optimal outcome.
Consider any net Ni ofM. By the fact that Ni is acyclic, it follows that there is a unique optimum outcome oNi in
Ni. Since we assume that inM there are no Pareto optimal outcomes, there must be an outcome β , oNi such that675
β pM oNi , i.e., β is preferred to oNi by all agents ofM. However, there is no outcome β such that β Ni oNi , because oNi
is the optimum outcome in Ni: a contradiction. Therefore, there must be a Pareto optimal outcome inM.
4.4. Complexity of Pareto optimums on mCP-nets
We now focus on Pareto optimum outcomes. In particular, the problems analyzed are deciding whether an outcome
is Pareto optimum, and deciding whether an mCP-net has a Pareto optimum outcome. Details of the proofs in this680
section are given starting at page 37.
To study the complexity of these problems, we first point out the following property. An mCP-net has a Pareto
optimum outcome if and only if all its individual CP-nets have the very same optimum outcome. Indeed, to be Pareto
optimum, an outcome has to dominate all other outcomes in all the CP-nets of the mCP-net: this property is satisfied
only by an outcome that is the optimum in all the CP-nets of the mCP-net. We state this property in the following685
lemma.
Lemma 4.9. LetM be an acyclic mCP-net. Then,M has a Pareto optimum outcome if and only if all the individual
CP-nets ofM have the very same optimum outcome (that, in which case, is also the Pareto optimum outcome ofM).
Based on the property above, we characterize the complexity of problems on Pareto optimum outcomes. We first
focus on deciding whether outcomes are Pareto optimum in mCP-nets. We show that this problem is solvable in690
LOGSPACE. More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Is-Pareto-Optimum
Instance: An mCP-netM and an outcome α.
Question: Is α Pareto optimum inM?
Observe that, by Lemma 4.9, to verify whether an outcome α is Pareto optimum, it suffices to check, for each
individual CP-net in turn, whether α is the individual optimal outcome for that agent. Recall that checking the individual
optimality of α is in LOGSPACE (see Theorem 3.7). We state this result in the following theorem.695
Theorem 4.10. LetM be an acyclic mCP-net, and let α ∈ OM be an outcome. Deciding whether α is Pareto optimum
inM is in LOGSPACE.
To conclude, we study the complexity of deciding whether an mCP-net has a Pareto optimum outcome. We show
that this problem is in P. More formally, consider the following problem.
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Problem: Exists-Pareto-Optimum
Instance: An mCP-netM.
Question: DoesM have a Pareto optimum outcome?
700
Since it is possible to check in LOGSPACE whether an outcome α is Pareto optimum, we can conclude that
deciding whether there exists a Pareto optimum in an mCP-net can be done in polynomial time. Indeed, to answer this
question, we can compute the optimum outcome α of one of the CP-nets of the mCP-net (this can be carried out in
polynomial time [11]), and then check in LOGSPACE that α is Pareto optimum (see above).
Theorem 4.11. LetM be an acyclic mCP-net. Deciding whetherM has a Pareto optimum outcome is in P.705
5. Complexity of majority voting on mCP-nets
In this section, we characterize the complexity of majority voting tasks on mCP-nets. We start by showing that
there are mCP-nets without majority optimal and optimum outcomes, which implies that deciding the existence of
majority optimal and optimum outcomes is not a trivial problem. In the preliminary section, we also define some
CP-nets that will be used in the reductions exhibited in this section. More specifically, we will introduce direct nets,710
which are CP-nets having a designated outcome as optimal. Moreover, we introduce summarized formula nets, which,
similarly to formula nets, are CP-nets encoding Boolean formulas, but they associate the satisfiability of formulas with
outcomes having specific values on just two features. Then, we analyze the complexity of deciding majority dominance
in mCP-nets, which is shown NP-complete. Subsequently, we devote our analysis to the problems related to majority
optimal outcomes, namely, deciding whether an outcome is majority optimal, and deciding whether an mCP-net has a715
majority optimal outcome. We prove the former co-NP-complete and the latter ΣP2-complete. To conclude, we study the
complexity of problems on majority optimum outcomes, namely, deciding whether an outcome is majority optimum,
and deciding whether an mCP-net has a majority optimum outcome. We prove the former ΠP2-complete and the latter is
shown ΠP2-hard and belonging to D
P
2 .
Recall that, given an mCP-netM and two different outcomes α, β ∈ OM, it holds that β majM α, if the majority of720
agents prefer β to α, i.e., |S M(β, α)| > |S ≺M(β, α)| + |S ./M(β, α)|. An outcome α is majority optimal in an mCP-net if α is
not majority dominated by any other outcome, while α is majority optimum if α majority dominates all other outcomes.
What we call majority optimal and majority optimum outcomes, in some works (see, e.g., the works by Li et al. [58]
and Felsenthal and Tideman [31]) are named weak and (strong) Condorcet winners, respectively. However, in the
literature (see, e.g., the works by Brandt et al. [20, 21] and Baumeister and Rothe [7]), the nomenclature of weak/strong725
Condorcet winner has also been used with a slightly different meaning. In particular, with this different meaning,
the strong Condorcet winner is the majority optimum outcome when the majority dominance relation requires that
more than half of the agents prefer an outcome to another, while the weak Condorcet winner is the majority optimum
outcome when the majority dominance relation requires that at least half of the agents prefer an outcome to another.
To avoid any confusion, in this paper, we prefer to stick to the concepts of majority optimal and majority optimum730
outcomes, which we introduced in Section 2.1.
5.1. Preliminaries
We first show that there are mCP-nets that do not have any majority optimal outcome, and hence neither a majority
optimum outcome. Thus, deciding whether an mCP-net has majority optimal or optimum outcomes is a non-trivial
problem.735
Theorem 5.1. There are acyclic binary singly-connected mCP-nets not having majority optimal and majority optimum
outcomes.
Proof. Consider the acyclic binary singly connected 4CP-netMNoWin = 〈N1,N2,N3,N4〉 defined in Figure 9.
The preferences encoded in the four nets are: ab N1 ab N1 ab N1 ab; ab N2 ab N2 ab N2 ab; ab N3 ab N3
ab N3 ab; and ab N4 ab N4 ab N4 ab. Observe that: ab is not majority optimal, because ab majMNoWin ab; ab is not740
majority optimal, because ab majMNoWin ab; ab is not majority optimal, because ab 
maj
MNoWin ab; and ab is not majority
optimal, because ab majMNoWin ab. This implies thatMNoWin does not have any majority optimal outcome, and hence also
either a majority optimum outcome.
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Figure 9: The 4CP-netMNoWin of Theorem 5.1.
We now define two CP-nets that will be used in the reductions of this section on majority voting. First, we define
direct nets, which intuitively are CP-nets that have a specific desired optimum outcome (recall that an acyclic CP-net745
has a unique optimal outcome, which is also optimum). Let S be a set of binary features defined over the usual values,
and let α ∈ Dom(S) be an outcome over S. The direct net D(α) = 〈GD(α),DomD(α),CPTD(α)〉 is the CP-net such that
FD(α) = S, ED(α) = ∅, the domain of each feature F of D(α) is the same as the domain of F in S, and the CP tables of
D(α) are such that, given a feature F, if α[F] = f , then the CP table for F is f  f , otherwise (i.e., α[F] = f ) the
CP table for F is f  f . See Figure 10 for an example. Given any outcome β ∈ OD(α) such that β , α, it holds that750
α D(α) β. Moreover, let β and γ be two different outcomes of D(α) such that, for all features F for which γ[F] , β[F],
it holds that γ[F] = α[F] (and hence β[F] , α[F]). Then, γ D(α) β. Note that D(α) is binary, acyclic, singly connected,
its indegree is zero, and the net can be built in polynomial time from α.
Figure 10: The direct net D(α), with α = abc.
We finally introduce summarized formula nets, which are similar to formula nets (of Section 3.1), with the advantage
that these new nets put in relationship the satisfiability of Boolean formulas with the flip of only two features, instead755
of with the flip of all variable and clause features. This advantage comes at the cost of losing the single connectedness
property of the nets, which, instead, is satisfied in non-summarized formula nets. Formally, let φ(X) be a Boolean
formula in 3CNF defined over the set of Boolean variables X = {x1, . . . , xn}, and whose set of clauses is C = {c1, . . . , cm}.
From φ(X), we build the CP-net Fs(φ) in the following way (see Figure 11).
The CP-net Fs(φ) embeds a formula net F(φ) (defined in Section 3.1) with its features and links. Moreover, in760
Fs(φ), there is an interconnecting net HC(m) (defined in Section 4.1), which is attached to all clause features of F(φ).
We denote by A the set of features belonging to the net HC(m) embedded in Fs(φ). To conclude with the features
of Fs(φ), there are two more features: U1 and U2, where U1 has no parents and is linked to all variable and literal
features of F(φ), while U2 is not the parent of any feature and its unique parent is the apex of the interconnecting net.
The CP tables of Fs(φ) are as follows:765
• feature U1 has the CP table u1  u1 ;
• for each variable xi ∈ X, features VTi and VFi have the CP tables
u1 vTi  vTi
u1 vTi  vTi
and
u1 vFi  vFi
u1 vFi  vFi
, respectively;
• for each literal ` j,k, if ` j,k = xi, then feature P j,k has the CP table
u1 ∧ vTi ∧ vFi p j,k  p j,k
else p j,k  p j,k ;770
otherwise, if ` j,k = ¬xi, then P j,k has the CP table
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Figure 11: A schematic representation of CP-net Fs(φ).
u1 ∧ vTi ∧ vFi p j,k  p j,k
else p j,k  p j,k ;
• clause features have the same CP table as in F(φ);
• features of the conjunctive interconnecting net HC(m) have the usual CP tables;
• feature U2, if feature A is the apex of the interconnecting net, has the CP table775
a u2  u2
a u2  u2 .
Note that Fs(φ) is binary, acyclic, its indegree is three, and the net can be built in polynomial time in the size
of φ. Moreover, the class of mCP-nets {Mipo(φ)}φ derived from formulas φ of the specified kind and according to the
reduction shown above is polynomially connected.
Now we give an equivalent of Lemma 3.1 for Fs(φ). In particular, the following lemma and corollary show that φ is780
satisfiable if and only if a particular outcome dominates others in Fs(φ).
Lemma 5.2. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over a set X of Boolean variables, and let σX be an
assignment on X. Let ασX be the outcome of Fs(φ) encoding σX on the feature set V, and assigning non-overlined
values to all other features. Let β be an outcome of Fs(φ) such that β[U1U2] = u1u2, assigning any value to the features
ofV, and assigning non-overlined values to all other features. Then:785
(1) There is an extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β Fs(φ) ασX ;
(2) There is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β ./Fs(φ) ασX .
Proof (sketch). The intuition at the base of the proof of this property is that, by linking U1 to variable and literal
features, these cannot be flipped to their overlined values once U1 is u1. Therefore, distinct literal features, attached to
the same features VTi and V
F
i , cannot be flipped to their overlined values according to contrasting values of V
T
i and V
F
i .790
Details of the proof are at page 38.
Corollary 5.3. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF, and let α and β be two outcomes of OFs(φ) such that in α the
values of all features are non-overlined, and in β the values of only U1 and of U2 are overlined. Then:
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• φ(X) is satisfiable if and only if β Fs(φ) α, and
• φ(X) is unsatisfiable if and only if β ./Fs(φ) α.795
Proof. Observe that, when the empty assignment σX is considered, outcome ασX of the statement of Lemma 5.2
coincides with outcome α of the statement of this corollary. Moreover, any assignment over X is an extension of the
empty one, and hence Lemma 5.2 applies.
5.2. Complexity of majority dominance on mCP-nets
First, we analyze the problem of deciding majority dominance on CP-nets, which is shown NP-complete. More800
formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Majority-Dominance
Instance: An mCP-netM, and two outcomes α, β ∈ OM.
Question: Is β majM α?
The following result shows that, for preference profiles represented via an NP-representation scheme, deciding
majority dominance is in NP.
Theorem 5.4. Let P be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via an805
NP-representation scheme, and let α and β be two outcomes. Then, deciding whether β maj
P
α is in NP.
Proof. Let P = 〈R1, . . . ,Rm〉. Observe first that, since |S P(β, α)| + |S ≺P(β, α)| + |S ./P(β, α)| = m, it holds that
|S 
P
(β, α)| > |S ≺
P
(β, α)| + |S ./P(β, α)| if and only if |S P(β, α)| >
⌊
m
2
⌋
. If β maj
P
α, then, for more than half of the
agents i, β Ri α. For such agents, since the preferences are represented via an NP-representation scheme, there is
a polynomial witness that they prefer β to α. Therefore, to show that β maj
P
α, it suffices to guess a set S of players810
preferring β to α, along with the polynomial witness of their preference, and then check that |S | >
⌊
m
2
⌋
and that the
witnesses are valid. The overall guess requires only polynomial space, and it can be checked in polynomial time.
Observe that, on 1CP-nets, majority dominance is equivalent to dominance on (simple) CP-nets. Therefore, the
following result, which follows directly from Theorem 3.3, states that on mCP-nets deciding majority dominance is
NP-hard.815
Theorem 5.5. LetM be an mCP-net, and let α, β ∈ OM be two outcomes. Then, deciding whether β majM α is NP-hard.
Hardness holds even on classes of singly connected acyclic binary mCP-nets with indegree at most three and at most
one agent.
By combining the two above results, we immediately obtain that deciding majority dominance over polynomially
connected classes of acyclic mCP-nets is NP-complete.820
Corollary 5.6. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. LetM ∈ C be an mCP-net, and let
α, β ∈ OM be two outcomes. Then, deciding whether β majM α is NP-complete.
5.3. Complexity of majority optimality on mCP-nets
Here, we analyze the problems on majority optimal outcomes. In particular, the problems considered are deciding
whether an outcome is majority optimal, and deciding whether an mCP-net has a majority optimal outcome. We first825
focus on deciding majority optimality of outcomes in mCP-nets. We show that this problem is co-NP-complete. More
formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Is-Majority-Optimal
Instance: An mCP-netM, and an outcome α ∈ OM.
Question: Is α majority optimal inM?
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The following theorem shows that, on preference profiles represented via an NP-representation scheme, deciding
whether an outcome is majority optimal is in co-NP.830
Theorem 5.7. Let P be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via an
NP-representation scheme, and let α be an outcome. Then, deciding whether α is majority optimal inP is in co-NP.
Proof. We show that disproving α being majority optimal is in NP. If α is not majority optimal inP , then there is an
outcome β such that β maj
P
α. Therefore, we can guess such an outcome β along with the witness that β maj
P
α (i.e.,
the set of agents preferring β to α). This guess requires only polynomial space, and can be checked in polynomial time835
(see the proof of Theorem 5.4).
Observe that, on 2CP-nets, majority dominance and Pareto dominance are equivalent. Therefore, the following
result, which follows directly from Theorem 4.6, shows that on mCP-nets deciding majority optimality is co-NP-hard.
Theorem 5.8. LetM be an mCP-net, and let α ∈ OM be an outcome. Then, deciding whether α is majority optimal is
co-NP-hard. Hardness holds even on polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary mCP-nets with indegree at most840
three and at most two agents.
By combining the two previous results, it follows immediately that deciding the majority optimality of an outcome
over polynomially connected classes of acyclic mCP-nets is co-NP-complete.
Corollary 5.9. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. LetM ∈ C be an mCP-net, and let
α ∈ OM be an outcome. Then, deciding whether α is majority optimal is co-NP-complete.845
We now focus on the problem of deciding the existence of majority optimal outcomes in mCP-nets. We show that
this problem is ΣP2-complete. More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Exists-Majority-Optimal
Instance: An mCP-netM.
Question: DoesM have a majority optimal outcome?
The following theorem shows that deciding whether a preference profile represented via an NP-representation
scheme has a majority optimal outcome is in ΣP2 .850
Theorem 5.10. LetP be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via an
NP-representation scheme. Then, deciding whetherP has a majority optimal outcome is in ΣP2 .
Proof. To show thatP has a majority optimal outcome, it suffices to guess an outcome α and then check that α is
actually majority optimal. Observe that guessing α requires an NP machine, and the final check can be carried out in
co-NP (see Theorem 5.7), which can be carried out by an oracle. Therefore, the overall procedure is in ΣP2 .855
To prove the ΣP2-hardness of Exists-Majority-Optimal, we use a reduction from QBF
CNF
2,∀,¬. Consider the following
construction. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)¬φ(X,Y) be a quantified formula where φ(X,Y) is a 3CNF Boolean formula defined
over two disjoint sets X = {x1, . . . , xnX } and Y = {y1, . . . , ynY } of Boolean variables, and whose set of clauses is
C = {c1, . . . , cm}. From Φ, we define the 6CP-netMeml(Φ) = 〈Neml1 , . . . ,Neml6 〉 as follows (intuitions on the aims of the
constructions of the CP-nets ofMeml(Φ) will be given in the proof sketch of Lemma 5.11 below).860
The features ofMeml(Φ) are:
• all the features of a net Fs(φ) (defined in Section 5.1) in which, in this case, we distinguish two variable feature
sets V = {VTi ,VFi | xi ∈ X} andW = {WTi ,WFi | yi ∈ Y} (recall that P and D are the sets of literal and clause
features, respectively, andA is the set of features of the conjunctive interconnecting net embedded in Fs(φ)); for
further reference, we call A the apex of the interconnecting net;865
• all the features of setV′ = {V ′i | xi ∈ X};
• all the features of the set B which are the features Bi of a disjunctive interconnecting net HD(|V′| + |W| + |P| +
|D| + |A|) and its apex is feature B (observe that features Bi are distinct from features Ai of the conjunctive
interconnecting net HC(m) embedded in Fs(φ)).
24
Figure 12: A schematic illustration of net Neml3 ofMeml(Φ). The direct net embedded in Neml3 is not reported in the figure.
To summarize, all the features ofMeml(Φ) are: V ∪V′ ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A ∪ B ∪ {U1,U2}.870
The CP-nets ofMeml(Φ) are:
• Neml1 is composed by a net Fs(φ) with its features, links, CP tables, and a direct net D(γ) (see Section 5.1), where
γ is defined over the set of featuresV′ ∪ B and assigns non-overlined values to all of them.
• Neml2 is similar to net Neml1 , with the only differences that features U1 and U2 are exchanged, and the CP tables of
Neml2 are adjusted to reflect this change.875
• Neml3 = 〈FNeml3 ,ENeml3 〉 is as follows (see Figure 12 for a schematic representation of the links). Links of Neml3 are
the following:
– for each xi ∈ X, {{VTi ,V ′i }, {VFi ,V ′i }} ⊂ ENeml3 ;
– a disjunctive interconnecting HC(|V′| + |W| + |P| + |D| + |A|) over feature set B which is connected to the
features inV′ ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A;880
– {{B,U1}, {U1,U2}} ⊂ ENeml3 .
CP tables of Neml3 are the following:
– features F ∈ (V ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A) have the CP tables f  f ;
– for each variable xi ∈ X, feature V ′i ∈ V′ has the CP table
vTi ∧ vFi v′i  v′i
else v′i  v′i
;885
– features in B of the interconnecting net have the usual CP tables;
– U1 has the CP table
b u1  u1
b u1  u1 ;
– U2 has the CP table
u1 u2  u2
u1 u2  u2 .890
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• Neml4 is equal to net Neml3 ;
• Neml5 is composed by a link from U1 to U2, and a direct net D(γ), where γ is defined over all features but U1 and
U2, and assigns non-overlined values to all of them. The other CP tables of Neml5 are:
– feature U1 has the CP table u1  u1 ;
– feature U2 has the CP table895
u1 u2  u2
u1 u2  u2 .
• Neml6 is characterized by having a link from feature U2 to any other feature. The CP tables of Neml6 are:
– feature U2 has the CP table u2  u2 ;
– features F different from U2 have the CP table
u2 f  f
u2 f  f .900
Observe thatMeml(Φ) is acyclic, binary, its indegree is three, and can be computed in polynomial time from φ.
Moreover, the class of mCP-nets {Meml(Φ)}Φ derived from formulas Φ of the specified kind and according to the
reduction shown above is polynomially connected. It is possible to show that Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)¬φ(X,Y) is valid if and
only ifMeml(Φ) has a majority optimal outcome.
Lemma 5.11. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)¬φ(X,Y) be a quantified Boolean formula, where φ(X,Y) is a 3CNF Boolean formula,905
defined over two disjoint sets X and Y of Boolean variables. Then, Φ is valid if and only ifMeml(Φ) has a majority
optimal outcome.
Proof (sketch). The intuition at the base of the proof is to put in relationship truth assignments over the variable set X
with outcomes ofMeml(Φ). In particular, given an assignment σX over X, the associated outcome is βσX , where σX is
encoded over the feature setV in the usual way, and all other features have non-overlined values. We show first that910
outcomes β not in the form of a βσX are not majority optimal. This is achieved by the specific construction of nets N
eml
3 ,
Neml4 , and N
eml
5 , which support such outcomes β not in the form of a βσX to be dominated by outcomes in which features
ofV′ ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A ∪ B are flipped to their non-overlined values. To have majority dominance in a 6CP-net, we
need four agents preferring an outcome to another. Hence, to achieve the above goal, the preferences of nets Neml3 , N
eml
4 ,
and Neml5 , are assisted by the preferences of nets N
eml
1 , N
eml
2 , and N
eml
6 , depending on the specific values of features in915 V ∪ {U1,U2} in the aforementioned outcome β. Next, we show that if all assignments σX are such (∀Y)¬φ(X/σX ,Y)
is not valid (i.e., it holds that (∃Y)φ(X/σX ,Y), which means that φ(X/σX ,Y) is satisfiable), then each outcome of the
kind βσX is not majority optimal. This is obtained by showing that such outcomes βσX are majority dominated by the
outcome α, which assigns overlined values only to U1 and U2. The fact that α majority dominates βσX is proven by
exploiting the preference structure of nets Neml1 and N
eml
2 , that encodes the satisfiability of φ(X,Y), and the preference920
structure of nets Neml5 and N
eml
6 , that supports the preference of α over many different outcomes. To conclude, we show
that if there is an assignment σX such that (∀Y)¬φ(X/σX ,Y) is valid (i.e., φ(X/σX ,Y) is not satisfiable), then βσX is
majority optimal, i.e., βσX is not be majority dominated. We achieve this by showing that:
• βσX is not dominated by any outcome differing from βσX on features inW∪P ∪ D ∪ A, because nets Neml3 ,
Neml4 , and N
eml
5 , vote against it, because they prefer outcomes like βσX with non-overlined values for features in925 W∪P ∪D ∪A;
• βσX is not dominated by any outcome differing from βσX on features inV′ ∪ B, because nets Neml1 , Neml2 , and
Neml5 , vote against it, because they prefer outcomes like βσX with non-overlined values for features inV′ ∪ B;
• βσX is not dominated by any outcome differing from βσX on features U1 and U2, because nets Neml3 , Neml4 , and
Neml1 or N
eml
2 , vote against it. In particular, N
eml
3 and N
eml
4 prefer outcomes like βσX with non-overlined values930
for U1 and U2, when the other features have non-overlined values. Nets Neml1 or N
eml
2 , when φ(X/σX ,Y) is not
satisfiable, do not prefer to βσX any other outcome with values for U1 and U2 different from u1u2;
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• βσX is not dominated by any outcome differing from βσX on features inV, because either nets Neml3 , Neml4 , and
Neml5 , or nets N
eml
1 , N
eml
2 , and N
eml
6 , depending on the specific case considered, vote against it. In particular, nets
Neml3 , N
eml
4 , and N
eml
5 are against the flipping of featuresV from their non-overlined value to their overlined value.935
Nets Neml1 , N
eml
2 , and N
eml
6 , when features U1 and U2 have values u1u2 like in βσX , are against the flipping of
featuresV from their overlined value to their non-overlined value.
Details of the proof are given at page 39.
We now prove that deciding whether an mCP-net has a majority optimal outcome is ΣP2-hard.
Theorem 5.12. LetM be an mCP-net. Then, deciding whether there is a majority optimal outcome inM is ΣP2-hard.940
Hardness holds even on polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary mCP-nets with indegree at most three and at
most six agents.
Proof. We prove the hardness of Exists-Majority-Optimal by showing a reduction from QBFCNF2,∀,¬. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)
¬φ(X,Y) be an instance of QBFCNF2,∀,¬, and consider the 6CP-netMeml(Φ). By Lemma 5.11, Φ is a “yes”-instance of
QBFCNF2,∀,¬ if and only if there is majority optimal outcome inMeml(Φ).945
By combining the two above results, we immediately conclude that deciding the existence of majority optimal
outcomes over polynomially connected classes of acyclic mCP-nets is ΣP2-complete.
Corollary 5.13. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. LetM ∈ C be an mCP-net. Then,
deciding whether there is a majority optimal outcome inM is ΣP2-complete.
5.4. Complexity of majority optimums on mCP-nets950
We now focus on majority optimum outcomes. In particular, the problems analyzed are deciding whether an
outcome is majority optimum, and deciding whether an mCP-net has a majority optimum outcome. We first consider
the problem of deciding whether an outcome is majority optimum in an mCP-net. We prove that this problem is
ΠP2-complete. More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Is-Majority-Optimum
Instance: An mCP-netM, and an outcome α ∈ OM.
Question: Is α majority optimum inM?
955
The following result shows that, on preference profiles represented via an NP-representations scheme, deciding
whether an outcome is majority optimum is in ΠP2 .
Theorem 5.14. LetP be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via an
NP-representation scheme, and let α be an outcome. Deciding whether α is majority optimum inP is in ΠP2 .
Proof. We prove the statement by showing that deciding whether α is not majority optimum inP is in ΣP2 . If α is960
majority optimum, then there is an outcome β such that α 6maj
P
β. Therefore, in order to prove that α is not majority
optimum, it suffices to guess β, and then check that α 6maj
P
β. Observe that guessing β requires an NP machine, and
then checking α 6maj
P
β is in co-NP (see Theorem 5.4), which can be carried out by an oracle. Therefore, the overall
procedure is in ΣP2 .
To prove the ΠP2-hardness of Is-Majority-Optimum, we use a reduction from QBF
CNF
2,∀,¬. Consider the following965
construction. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)¬φ(X,Y) be a quantified formula where φ(X,Y) is a 3CNF Boolean formula defined
over two disjoint sets X = {x1, . . . , xnX } and Y = {y1, . . . , ynY } of Boolean variables, and whose set of clauses is
C = {c1, . . . , cm}. From φ(X,Y), we define the 3CP-netMimm(Φ) = 〈N imm1 ,N imm2 ,N imm3 〉 in the following way (intuitions
on the aims of the constructions of the CP-nets ofMimm(Φ) are given in the proof sketch of Lemma 5.15 below).
The features ofMimm(Φ) are:970
• all the features of a net Fs(φ) (defined in Section 5.1) in which, in this case, we distinguish two variable feature
sets V = {VTi ,VFi | xi ∈ X} andW = {WTi ,WFi | yi ∈ Y} (recall that P and D are the sets of literal and clause
features, respectively, andA is the set of features of the conjunctive interconnecting net embedded in Fs(φ));
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• all the features of setV′ = {V ′i | xi ∈ X};
• all the features of the set B which are the features Bi of a disjunctive interconnecting net (defined in Section 4.1)975
HD(|V′| + |W| + |P| + |D| + |A|) and its apex is feature B (observe that features Bi are distinct from features Ai
of the conjunctive interconnecting net HC(m) embedded in Fs(φ)).
To summarize, all the features ofMimm(Φ) are: V ∪V′ ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A ∪ B ∪ {U1,U2}.
The CP-nets ofMimm(Φ) are:
• N imm1 is composed by a net Fs(φ) with its features, links, and CP tables, and a direct net D(γ) (see Section 5.1),980
where γ is defined over features inV′ ∪ B and assigns non-overlined values to all of them.
• N imm2 = D(α), with α defined over all the features ofMimm(Φ), and having overlined values only for features U1
and U2.
• N imm3 = 〈FN imm3 ,EN imm3 〉 is as follows (see Figure 12 for a schematic representation of the links of Neml3 , which is
equivalent to N imm3 ). Links of N
imm
3 are the following:985
– for each xi ∈ X, {{VTi ,V ′i }, {VFi ,V ′i }} ⊂ EN imm3 ;
– a disjunctive interconnecting HC(|V′| + |W| + |P| + |D| + |A|) over feature set B which is connected to the
features inV′ ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A;
– {{B,U1}, {U1,U2}} ⊂ EN imm3 .
CP tables of N imm3 are the following:990
– features F ∈ (V ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A) have the CP tables f  f ;
– for each variable xi ∈ X, feature V ′i ∈ V′ has the CP table
vTi ∧ vFi v′i  v′i
else v′i  v′i
;
– features in B of the interconnecting net have the usual CP tables;
– U1 has the CP table995
b u1  u1
b u1  u1 ;
– U2 has the CP table
u1 u2  u2
u1 u2  u2 .
Observe thatMimm(Φ) is acyclic, binary, its indegree is three, and can be computed in polynomial time from φ.
Moreover, the class of mCP-nets {Mimm(Φ)}Φ derived from formulas Φ of the specified kind and according to the1000
reduction shown above is polynomially connected. The following result shows that Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)¬φ(X,Y) is valid if
and only if a particular outcome ofMimm(Φ) is majority optimum.
Lemma 5.15. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)¬φ(X,Y) be a quantified Boolean formula, where φ(X,Y) is a 3CNF Boolean formula,
defined over two disjoint sets X and Y of Boolean variables. Then, Φ is valid if and only if Mimm(Φ) does not
have a majority optimum outcome. In particular, whenMimm(Φ) has a majority optimum outcome it is the outcome1005
α ∈ OMimm(Φ) assigning overlined values only to features U1 and U2.
Proof (sketch). The intuition at the base of the proof is to put in relationship truth assignments over the variable set X
with outcomes ofMimm(Φ). In particular, given an assignment σX over X, the associated outcome is βσX , where σX
is encoded over the feature set V in the usual way, and all other features have non-overlined values. We show first
that α majority dominates any other outcome β that is not in the form of a βσX outcome, and hence none of them is1010
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majority optimum. Intuitively, we achieve by the specific preference structure of nets N imm2 and N
imm
3 . Indeed, N
imm
2
always prefers α, because N imm2 is a direct net purposefully designed in this way. Net N
imm
3 prefers outcomes having
non-overlined values for featuresV′ ∪W ∪ P ∪D ∪A ∪ B∪. In some cases, we need the preference structure of
N imm1 along with N
imm
2 to show that α is majority preferred to outcomes that are not in the form of a βσX . Next, we
partition the outcomes of the kind βσX in those with σX such that (∀Y)¬φ(X/σX ,Y) is not valid (i.e., it holds that1015
(∃Y)φ(X/σX ,Y), which means that φ(X/σX ,Y) is satisfiable), and those with σX such that (∀Y)¬φ(X/σX ,Y) is valid
(i.e., φ(X/σX ,Y) is not satisfiable). For the outcomes βσX with σX such that φ(X/σX ,Y) is satisfiable, we show that
α majority dominates them. We prove this by exploiting the fact that N imm1 encodes the satisfiability of φ(X,Y), and
hence, according to N imm1 , α is preferred to βσX , and the fact that N
imm
2 prefers α. For the outcomes βσX with σX such
that φ(X/σX ,Y) is not satisfiable, we show that α does not majority dominate them and is not majority dominated by1020
them. We achieve this again by exploiting the preference structure of N imm1 , because, when φ(X/σX ,Y) is not satisfiable,
α ./N imm1 βσX . Therefore, we obtain that α is majority optimum if and only if there are no assignments σX such that
(∀Y)¬φ(X/σX ,Y) is valid. Details of the proof are given at page 43.
The next result shows that deciding whether an outcome is majority optimum in an mCP-net is ΠP2-hard.
Theorem 5.16. LetM be an mCP-net, and let α ∈ OM be an outcome. Then, deciding whether α is majority optimum1025
inM is ΠP2-hard. Hardness holds even on polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary mCP-nets with indegree at
most three and at most three agents.
Proof. We prove the statement by showing that deciding whether α is not majority optimum is ΣP2-hard, and we do
this by exhibiting a reduction from QBFCNF2,∀,¬ to the complement problem to Is-Majority-Optimum. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)
¬φ(X,Y) be an instance of QBFCNF2,∀,¬, and consider the 3CP-netMimm(Φ), and the outcome α in which only the values1030
of features U1 and U2 are overlined. By Lemma 5.15, Φ is a “yes”-instance of QBFCNF2,∀,¬ if and only if α is not majority
optimum inMimm(Φ).
Note that, with respect to the number of agents, the above result is optimal. Indeed, since majority dominance and
Pareto dominance are equivalent on mCP-nets with m ≤ 2, it is not possible to show the ΠP2-hardness of Is-Majority-
Optimum on mCP-nets with m < 3.1035
By combining the two previous results, we immediately conclude that deciding whether an outcome is majority
optimum over polynomially connected classes of acyclic mCP-nets is ΠP2-complete.
Corollary 5.17. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. LetM ∈ C be an mCP-net, and let
α ∈ OM be an outcome. Then, deciding whether α is majority optimum inM is ΠP2-complete.
To conclude, we study the complexity of deciding whether an mCP-net has a majority optimum outcome. We show1040
that the problem is ΠP2-hard and belongs to D
P
2 . More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Exists-Majority-Optimum
Instance: An mCP-netM.
Question: DoesM have a majority optimum outcome?
We prove that deciding whether a preference profile represented via an NP-representation scheme has a majority
optimum outcome is in DP2 .
To achieve this result, we carry out the following considerations. First, observe that an outcome to be majority1045
optimum must be also majority optimal. Hence, to individuate majority optimum outcomes, we just need to look for
them among the majority optimal ones. To do so, we can select the majority optimal outcomes and exclude those that
are not also majority optimum. Notice that, when the majority optimum exists, then it is the only majority optimal
outcome. For this reason, a preference profile P has a majority optimum outcome if and only if P has majority
optimal outcomes and it is not true thatP has majority optimal outcomes that are not also majority optimum. Hence,1050
there are two tasks needed to be solved in order to decide whether a profile P has a majority optimum outcome:
(1) decide whetherP has majority optimal outcomes; and (2) decided whetherP does not have majority optimal
outcomes that are not also optimum. By combining the complexity of these two task, we show that deciding whether a
profileP has a majority optimum outcome is in DP2 .
We already know that the complexity of task (1) is in ΣP2 (see Theorem 5.10). The following lemma shows that the1055
complement of task (2) is in ΣP2 .
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Lemma 5.18. Let P be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via an
NP-representation scheme. Then, deciding whether P has majority optimal outcomes that are not also majority
optimum is in ΣP2 .
Proof. To solve the task of the lemma, it is sufficient to guess two different outcomes α and β, which can be carried1060
out in NP. Then, through a co-NP oracle call, we check that α is actually majority optimal (see Theorem 5.7), then
through another oracle call in co-NP, we check that α 6maj
P
β (see Theorem 5.4). If the answer to the latter oracle call is
“yes”, then it means that α is a majority optimal outcome that is not majority optimum (because α does not majority
dominate β). To conclude, observe that the overall procedure is in ΣP2 .
We are now ready to prove that deciding the existence of majority optimum outcomes is in DP2 .1065
Theorem 5.19. LetP be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via an
NP-representation scheme. Then, deciding whetherP has a majority optimum outcome is in DP2 .
Proof. Let O be a combinatorial domain. Let A be the set of all the preference profiles over O having at least a majority
optimal outcome. Let B be the set of all the preference profiles over O not having majority optimal outcomes that are
not also majority optimum (observe that in B there might be profiles with no majority optimal outcome at all, and1070
profiles having a majority optimal outcome that is also majority optimum). The intersection A ∩ B is the set of all
the preference profiles over O having a majority optimum outcome: deciding A is the task (1) mentioned above, and
deciding B is the task (2) mentioned above.
If we focus only on NP-representations schemes, then set A can be decided in ΣP2 (see Theorem 5.10), and set B can
be decided in ΠP2 (recognizing the complement of B is in Σ
P
2 , see Lemma 5.18). Therefore, deciding whetherP has a1075
majority optimum outcome is in DP2 .
For a lower bound of the problem Exists-Majority-Optimum we can exploit the construction used to show the
lower bound of Is-Majority-Optimum, and obtain the following theorem, which proves that on mCP-nets deciding the
existence of a majority optimum outcome is ΠP2-hard.
Theorem 5.20. Let M be an mCP-net. Then, deciding whether M has a majority optimum outcome is ΠP2-hard.1080
Hardness holds even on polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary mCP-nets with indegree at most three and at
most three agents.
Proof. We prove the statement by showing a reduction from QBFCNF2,∀,¬ to the complement problem to Exists-Majority-
Optimum. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)¬φ(X,Y) be an instance of QBFCNF2,∀,¬, and consider the 3CP-netMimm(Φ). By Lemma 5.15,
Φ is a “yes”-instance of QBFCNF2,∀,¬ if and only ifMimm(Φ) has not a majority optimum outcome.1085
By combining the two above results, we immediately conclude that deciding the existence of majority optimum
outcomes over polynomially connected classes of acyclic mCP-nets is ΠP2-hard and in D
P
2 .
Corollary 5.21. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. LetM ∈ C be an mCP-net. Then,
deciding whetherM has a majority optimum outcome is ΠP2-hard and in DP2 .
6. Related work1090
In this section, we describe the larger context of this work in the literature, especially its relationship to previous
work on compact representations of preferences, global and sequential voting, and the notion of O-legality.
6.1. Compact representations of preferences
The preferences of agents can be represented in different ways, and preference (representation) models can
essentially be divided into quantitative and qualitative ones [11, 29, 52]. The former preference models associate1095
with each outcome a numerical value, which is the value of a utility function, and preferences between outcomes are
evaluated by comparing the utility values. The latter preference models provide a (not necessarily complete) order over
the outcomes, which can be represented in multiple ways, e.g., via a plain sequence of outcomes, or, more generally,
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via a binary relation over the outcomes, i.e., a set of ordered pairs of outcomes, in which the first outcome of the pair is
considered preferred to the second. The key point of qualitative preferences is that there is no precise quantification of1100
the utility associated with the outcomes. For this reason, it has been argued in the literature that qualitative preference
are easier to be stated by humans [3, 11, 16, 43], as it is not necessary to estimate the utility values, which can be quite
challenging. In this paper, we focus only on qualitative preference models, encoding preference relations.
A preference model is extensive, if for any preference relation R that it is capable to represent, each outcome of the
domain of R appears explicitly at least once in its representation of R. This implies that the size of its representation1105
of R is at least linear in the number of outcomes of R. So, for example, a sequence of all the outcomes, or listing all
the pairs of a preference relation, are both extensive representations. By definition, the number of possible outcomes
in combinatorial domains is exponential in the number of features. Hence, the extensive representation of agents’
preferences over combinatorial domains becomes quickly infeasible and unrealistic when the number of features is more
than just a few. For this reason, compact formalisms to represent combinatorial preferences are needed [51, 52, 55].1110
An ideal compact representation scheme for combinatorial preferences would be one such that the space required
for the representation is polynomial in the number of the features (and not in the number of the outcomes, like
for extensive representations). For information-theoretic reasons, it is not possible to have a preference model to
compactly represent any possible preference relation over a combinatorial domain. Indeed, for a combinatorial domain
characterized by n features of two values each, i.e., binary features, the number of all possible (complete) relations is1115
(2n)!, which is O(22
n
).5 Hence, no preference model could ever represent all the possible preference relations using
only polynomial space in n [55]. Nonetheless, if we want to represent preference relations showing particular structures
or patterns, then it is possible to take advantage of these patterns and “decompose” the relation to summarize it into a
concise representation. In the literature, there has been considerable work on exploiting the structure of preferences
to appropriately decompose them, and, e.g., Lang [52] gives a survey of different logical languages for compact1120
preference representation (see also the work of Boutilier et al. [11] for more references).
Among the preferences’ structural patterns exploited to achieve compact representations, the (conditional) prefer-
ence independence of the features is one of the most studied (see the works by Boutilier et al. [11], Chevaleyre et al.
[22], Keeney and Raiffa [49], Lang [52, 53], Lang and Xia [54, 55], Xia et al. [84], and references therein). Intuitively,
the (conditional) preferential independence of the features implies that the preference relation between outcomes1125
varying on specific features can be influenced by the values of some features and can be totally independent from the
values of some other features. When features are (conditionally) preferentially independent, it roughly means that
portions of the structure of the preference relation are replicated throughout the preference relation. Therefore, these
patterns in the preferences can be “factorised” to save space in the representation.
In the literature, (conditional) ceteris paribus preference statements have been proposed several times to compactly1130
represent preferences with (conditional) preferential independencies among (sets of) features [11, 52]. Moreover, a
preference representation scheme should capture statements that are natural for agents to assess, and (conditional)
ceteris paribus preference statements have several times been argued to be intuitive for users, as they resemble the way
in which humans express their preferences and act upon them [11, 13, 44, 45].
Ceteris paribus means “all else being equal”, and ceteris paribus statements were classically defined to be non-1135
conditional [44]. Given a set of featuresV ⊆ F , a non-conditional ceteris paribus preference statement sounds like:
“Outcomes varying overV, and all else being equal, are ranked according to the following preference relation restricted
overV”. For example, a non-conditional ceteris paribus preference statement is “I prefer a round table to a square one,
all else being equal” [44]. In this example, the setV contains the feature “shape” (of the table). Observe that, here, the
“all else being equal” does not refer to the fact that the values of the other features determine the preference relation1140
restricted overV. Instead, it means that the given ceteris paribus statement allows to compare outcomes varying only
onV: outcomes varying overV and other features cannot be compared via the given statement.
Boutilier et al. [11, 13] extended the idea of ceteris paribus statements to conditional ceteris paribus preference
statements. In this case, given two disjoint sets of featuresV,Z ⊆ F , a conditional ceteris paribus preference statement
sounds like: “Given the specific instantiation γ of values for the features inZ, outcomes varying overV, and all else1145
being equal, are ranked according to the following preference relation restricted overV”. For example, a conditional
5Allen et al. [4] provide an interesting study on the number of different CP-nets that may exist when various constraints on their structure are
considered.
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ceteris paribus preference statement could be “Given that the main course of the dinner is meat, I prefer a red wine to a
white one, all else being equal”. Here,Z contains the feature “main course”, whileV contains the feature “wine”.
Among the representation schemes proposed in the literature based on (conditional) ceteris paribus statements,
one using propositional logics was proposed by Lang [52], while Boutilier et al. [11, 13] proposed CP-nets; for other1150
representations based on (conditional) ceteris paribus statements, see references in the works by Lang [52] and Boutilier
et al. [11]. More details on CP-nets are given in the introduction and in the preliminaries.
6.2. Global and sequential voting
Dependencies are certainly a critical characteristic to model, especially to attain compact representations, however,
they can become troublesome when combinatorial preferences are aggregated. Whether dependencies are actually1155
problematic or not depends on the specific ways in which agents’ votes are collected. These specific ways in which
votes are collected are called voting protocols [24]. A voting protocol characterizes how a voting rule is implemented,
i.e., it determines which information is elicited from the agents, and when this is done. In the literature, a number
of different voting protocols for combinatorial vote have been considered (see, e.g., the works by Chevaleyre et al.
[22], Lacy and Niou [50], Lang and Xia [55], and references therein). Two of them are global and sequential1160
voting [22, 50, 53, 54, 55, 84].
In global voting, agents’ preferences over the entire combinatorial domain are collected at the same time, and then
a voting rule is applied to the entire preference profile to select the winner(s). In case of (m)CP-nets, global voting
consists in the agents communicating their whole CP-nets for vote aggregation. In sequential voting, votes are collected
feature-by-feature. In particular, agents express at the same time their preferences over the individual features, and1165
votes for the different features are collected sequentially in consecutive steps. In this case, a voting rule determines the
winning value v for a feature, and, most importantly, agents are informed about v before the next feature is considered
for voting in the protocol. Note that sometimes, in sequential voting, instead of voting for a sequence of single features,
agents may be asked in a step of the protocol to express their preferences over the combined values (i.e., the value
vectors) of a set of features (see, e.g., the works by Xia et al. [84] and Airiau et al. [1]). Global voting is the protocol of1170
the voting semantics in mCP-nets.
Dependencies are not an issue in global voting, because agents communicate their preferences over the entire
(exponential) combinatorial domain (or the entire CP-nets, if CP-nets are used to represent the agents’ preferences),
and hence all the information needed for the aggregation is available. However, global voting can be expensive to
implement and evaluate, especially if extensive representations are adopted or preference relations are extensively1175
unfolded from the compact representation before any further processing. Strictly speaking, from a theoretical perspective
the computational complexity of aggregating preferences represented via extensive schemes can be lower than the
complexity of performing the same task over compactly represented preferences. However, this computational
simplification is artificial, because the computational complexity of a problem is evaluated relative to the size of
the input. For extensive representations, the input is huge, and hence the computational complexity of problems1180
over this kind of input can be low. Nevertheless, processing input of huge size can be computationally challenging.
The computational burden of global voting can be limited by adopting sequential voting. A benefit of sequential
voting over global voting is lowering the communication complexity, i.e., the amount of information needed to be
exchanged by the agents to implement the protocol [22, 24, 55]. In sequential voting, agents are enquired in consecutive
steps about their preferences for individual features, therefore the information required to be exchanged is only the1185
preferences “projected” over individual features. However, feature dependencies can be quite detrimental for sequential
voting, to the point that sub-optimal outcomes are selected—examples of this phenomenon are called multiple election
paradoxes—or agents can experience regret after voting [22, 50, 53, 54, 55, 84]. Intuitively, paradoxes may occur in
sequential voting, because votes over the different features are collected separately, and this can clash with the different
individual preferential dependencies that agents may have between features—more specifically, it might be the case1190
that agents have to vote on a feature whose preferences depend on features for which it has not been voted yet [19].
Lacy and Niou [50] showed that these paradoxes in sequential voting can be (partly) avoided if the considered
preferences are separable, i.e., they do not have dependencies among features. Intuitively, when represented via CP-nets,
combinatorial preferences without dependencies among features do not have any edge between vertices. This is a very
strong assumption, and it is unlikely to be met in practice [53, 54, 84, 85]. In fact, in many real situations, preferences1195
exhibit feature preference dependencies, and having the ability to deal with them is important, also because separable
preferences are a quite small fraction of combinatorial preferences, and hence their expressivity is quite limited.
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6.3. Overcoming multiple election paradoxes via O-legality
To overcome the strong limitation imposed by preference separability, Lang [53] proposed and investigated a
weaker structural restriction of preferences, called O-legality, which preserves the nice properties of sequential voting1200
(when evaluated over separable preferences) on a wider class of combinatorial preferences. Intuitively, a preference
profile is O-legal, if the dependencies among the features for all the agents comply with a common sequence. More
formally, if O = (F1, . . . , Fm) is a sequence of all the features of the combinatorial domain, a preference profile P is
O-legal, if for any agent A and any two features Fi and F j, if Fi precedes F j in O, then A’s preferences for Fi do not
depend on F j’s value [85]. The concept of O-legality has an immediate translation over CP-nets. Indeed, a profile of1205
(preferences represented via) CP-nets is O-legal, if O is a topological order for all the CP-nets’ graphs of the profile.
Observe that the existence of a topological order for the features of a CP-net imposes that the graph of the CP-net is
acyclic.
The intuitiveness of CP-nets to model combinatorial preferences, together with the convenient characterization of
O-legality in CP-nets, has largely encouraged the study of sequential voting in O-legal (and acyclic) CP-nets. In a first1210
group of works, the sequential composition of the voting rule assumed that a feature order was given beforehand (and
the voting rule was defined upon the given order) [53, 54, 84]. Next, this idea was generalized by assuming that the
sequential voting rule was not defined given the specific order [85], however, the existence of a shared topological order
among the features was anyway required. A study on how well solutions computed via sequential voting approximate
the winning outcomes obtained via global voting was presented by Conitzer and Xia [25]. Also various other works1215
considered O-legal CP-nets (see, e.g., the works by Cornelio et al. [27], Grandi et al. [36], Loreggia et al. [60], Maran
et al. [65], and Mattei et al. [66]). Among them, an interesting approach to preference aggregation over O-legal CP-nets
was proposed by Cornelio et al. [27], where “probabilistic” CP-nets were used to represent the result of the aggregation
(see the works by Bigot et al. [8] and Cornelio et al. [26] for more on probabilistic CP-nets).
6.4. Going beyond O-legality1220
However, also O-legality is somewhat demanding, because it imposes that there are no “inversions” in the preference
dependencies. For example, if in a profile of CP-nets encoding preferences for a dinner there were an agent whose
choice of the main dish influences the choice of the wine and an other agent whose choice of the wine influences the
choice of the main dish, then those CP-nets would not be O-legal. (Observe that the profile of CP-nets in Figure 2 is
not O-legal). Hence, also assuming O-legality is in the end quite restrictive [58, 75, 82]. To go beyond the restrictions1225
imposed by O-legality, different approaches were proposed.
One of these approaches is generalizing the idea of sequential voting. A voting agenda specifies the order in which
the features have to be considered in sequential voting. If the voting agenda does not clash with any of the feature
dependencies of all the agents, then it is possible to avoid multiple election paradoxes. In particular, if O is a shared
topological order of the features of the CP-nets in a profile, then O is a voting agenda compatible with the feature1230
dependencies of all the agents. A generalization of this idea is to have a sequence of elections for sets of joint features
that cannot be decomposed due to preferential dependencies of some of the agents. In this way, the problem can be
shifted to deciding suitable generalized voting agendas that do not clash with the agents’ feature dependencies [1].
Another approach to overcome the limitations imposed by O-legality is hypercubewise preference aggregation [82].
This family of voting rules decomposes the preference aggregation task into two phases: first, a (hypercubewise)1235
dominance graph is built by applying local voting rules to set of outcomes differing only for the value of a single
specific feature (these outcomes are the neighboring vertices of the induced preference graph of CP-nets, which, in
case of binary features, constitute a hypercube—this is where the name of the voting rule comes from); and then the
winners are chosen from the hypercubewise dominance graph via choice sets functions, which may select dominating
or undominated outcomes in the graph. The idea of the hypercubewise aggregation is at the base of the definition of the1240
hypercubewise Condorcet winner (i.e., the hypercubewise majority winner, which is the outcome majority dominating
all its neighbors) [23, 82], also called the local Condercet winner, in which the hypercubewise dominance graph is
obtained via majority voting. The definition of the hypercubewise Condorcet winner is different from the definition
of the standard, or global, Condorcet winner (the majority optimum outcome, in this paper) obtained from global
voting [23, 82]. Also the dominance relation inferred from the hypercubewise dominance graph is different from the1245
standard majority dominance relation obtained via global voting [58]. Li et al. [58] investigated also other relations
between local and global Condorcet winners. It was shown that deciding the existence of hypercubewise Condorcet
winners is NP-complete [23, 58].
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A third approach proposes, similarly to the previous, to define new voting rules that can also be applied over profiles
of non O-legal CP-nets. These new rules select the outcomes minimizing the total value of a loss function evaluated1250
over the profile of CP-nets [74, 75].
6.5. Analysis of global voting over CP-nets
Although the approaches mentioned in Section 6.4 can deal with CP-net profiles that are not O-legal, they do not
address the complexity analysis of global voting over (not necessarily O-legal) acyclic CP-nets. In fact, global voting
over non-O-legal acyclic CP-nets has not received as much attention as sequential voting, although it was explicitly1255
stated in the literature that a theoretical comparison between global and sequential voting would have been highly
promising [53].
Rossi et al. [71] carried out the first work studying global voting over (not necessarily O-legal) acyclic CP-nets,
when mCP-nets were defined. Recall that the group dominance semantics of mCP-nets is global voting over a profile of
CP-nets. Voting schemes over mCP-nets were considered from an algorithmic perspective by Rossi et al. [71], which1260
gave a computational insight for global voting over CP-nets. However, most of the algorithms considered by Rossi et al.
[71] were brute-force. Therefore, these algorithms gave only EXPTIME upper bounds for most of the global voting
tasks over CP-nets, and no hardness result was provided by Rossi et al. [71].
Algorithms exploiting SAT solvers to compute Pareto and majority optimal outcomes according to global voting
over profiles of (not necessarily O-legal) acyclic CP-nets were proposed by Li et al. in [57] and [56], respectively.1265
A SAT solver is used by Li et al. [58] to compute, over profiles of even cyclic (and therefore also non O-legal) CP-nets,
majority optimal and majority optimum outcomes according to global voting, starting from hypercubewise weak
Condorcet winners. The approach adopted by Li et al. [58] was subsequently extended by Li et al. [59] to also consider
the possibility of multi-valued and incomplete CP-nets.
Despite the mentioned works advanced the study of global voting over (not necessarily O-legal) acyclic CP-nets,1270
they still did not provide precise complexity results. As mentioned in the introduction, the precise complexity of these
problems was actually reported as an open problem multiple times in the literature [53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 74]. Our work is
the first in the literature tackling directly the complexity analysis of dominance in mCP-nets (and hence the complexity
of global voting over CP-nets).
7. Conclusion1275
In this paper, we have carried out a thorough complexity analysis of the Pareto and majority semantics in mCP-nets.
Given the specific definitions of group dominance in mCP-nets, these results also characterize the complexity of Pareto
and majority global voting over CP-nets, which was missing and asked for in the literature various times. Unlike what
is often assumed in the literature, in this work, we have not restricted the profiles of CP-nets to be O-legal, which makes
the results achieved here more general. For the Pareto and the majority voting schemes, we have analyzed the problems1280
of deciding dominance, optimal and optimum outcomes, and the existence of optimal and optimum outcomes. We have
shown completeness results for most cases, which means that we have provided tight lower bounds for problems that
(up to now) did not have any explicit lower bound transcending the obvious hardness due to the dominance test over the
underlying CP-nets. Our hardness results are given for polynomially connected classes of binary acyclic (m)CP-nets.
This means that our hardness results extend to classes of (m)CP-nets encompassing the CP-nets here considered, and in1285
particular also to general mCP-nets with partial CP-nets or multi-valued features. The various problems analyzed here
have been put at various levels of the polynomial hierarchy, and some of them are even tractable (in P or LOGSPACE),
which is quite interesting given that for most of these tasks only EXPTIME upper-bounds were known in the literature.
There are various possible directions for further research. The lower bound for the problem of deciding the existence
of majority optimum outcomes does not match the upper bound (ΠP2-hardness and membership in D
P
2 , respectively).1290
Hence, it would be interesting to close this gap and find the precise complexity of the problem. Furthermore,
characterizing the complexity of preference aggregation when partial CP-nets are allowed to be part of mCP-nets would
be interesting, since with (standard) CP-nets, indifference between outcomes are not allowed. Having constraints on
the feasibility of outcomes is another interesting direction of investigation. Without any constraint, CP-nets model
agents’ preferences when it is assumed that all outcomes are attainable. However, this is not always the case. During1295
the aggregation process, we should take into account what outcomes are feasible. For example, to decide whether an
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outcome is majority dominated by another, we should check that the latter is actually feasible. It will be interesting
studying the case in which constraints are issued over the outcome domain prior the preference aggregation and the
case in which constraints are considered after the aggregation. A similar idea characterized the solution concepts
in NTU cooperative games defined via constraints [37, 39]. NTU games, i.e., non-transferable utility games, are1300
cooperative games in which players do not have complete freedom in sharing the worth that they get by forming
a coalition. Constraints were used to compactly define the allowed worth distributions available to the players of
coalitions. This approach could be merged with the definition of constrained CP-nets [12, 69], Finally, it will also be
interesting investigating structural restrictions on the structure of CP-nets, in the spirit of what was done in the works
by Brafman et al. [17], Greco et al. [38, 40, 41], and Ieong and Shoham [46], to identify broader classes of CP-nets1305
where the dominance test is tractable, whereas, in general, over acyclic CP-nets the dominance test is NP-hard.
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Appendix A. Detailed proofs1310
Appendix A.1. Proofs for Section 3
Lemma 3.1. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over a set X of Boolean variables, and let σX be an
assignment on X. Let ασX be the outcome of F(φ) encoding σX on the feature set V, and assigning non-overlined
values to all other features, and let β be the outcome assigning overlined values to all and only variable and clause
features. Then:1315
(1) There is an extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β F(φ) ασX .
(2) There is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β ./F(φ) ασX .
Proof. We first prove (1).
(⇒) Assume that there is an extension σ′X of σX to X satisfying φ(X). To prove that β F(φ) ασX we show that there is
an improving flipping sequence from ασX to β.1320
Recall that σ′X is a complete assignment over X, and that if σX is complete, then σ
′
X = σX . For each variable xi
not defined in σX , if σ′X[xi] = true, then we flip feature V
T
i from v
T
i to v
T
i , analogously if σ
′
X[xi] = false, then
we flip feature VFi from v
F
i to v
F
i .
For all literals ` j,k evaluating to true in σ′X , we flip the corresponding literal features P j,k from p j,k to p j,k.
Since σ′X is a satisfying assignment, for each clause c j of φ, there is at least a literal ` j,k evaluating to true in σ
′
X .1325
For this reason, given any clause feature D j, at this point of the flipping sequence, there is at least one literal
feature P j,k with value p j,k, and hence we can flip D j from d j to d j. We can do this for every clause feature.
Then, we flip to their overlined value all variable features that have not been flipped until now. By the definition
of the CP tables of literal features, we can flip all features P j,k having value p j,k to p j,k, because in the outcome
having been built so far through the flips shown above, for all pairs of features (VTi ,V
F
i ), their values are v
T
i v
F
i .1330
To conclude, observe that the obtained outcome is exactly β, and hence β F(φ) ασX .
(⇐) Assume that β F(φ) ασX . We show that there is an extension σ′X of σX to X satisfying φ(X). Since β F(φ) ασX ,
there is an improving flipping sequence ρ : γ0 → . . . → γz from γ0 = ασX to γz = β. Consider the truth
assignment σ′X built as follows: If there is an index q such that γq[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , then σ
′
X[xi] = true; and if
there is an index q such that γq[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , then σ
′
X[xi] = false.1335
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We first show that σ′X is consistent, complete, and an extension of σX to X. Observe that, by the definition of
the CP tables of variable features, and the fact that those features have no parents, once a variable feature is
flipped to its overlined value, it cannot be flipped back. Therefore, it cannot be the case that there are indices
q and r for which there are variable features VTi and V
F
i such that γq[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i and γr[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i .
Hence, σ′X is consistent. Moreover, we claim that, for any variable xi, there is always an index q such that1340
γq[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i or γq[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , which implies that σ
′
X is complete. Indeed, if xi has a value in σX ,
then the index q that we are looking for is q = 0 (because either γ0[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i or γ0[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , by
the definition of γ0 = ασX ). Observe that this, along with the consistency of σ
′
X proven above, implies that
σ′X[xi] = σX[xi] for each variable xi having a truth value in σX . On the other hand, if xi has not a value in σX ,
then, since γ0[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i and γz[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , it must be the case that there is an index q > 0 such that1345
γq[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i or γq[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i . Hence, σ
′
X is complete. To conclude, by all the properties above, σ
′
X is
also an extension of σX to X.
We now prove that σ′X satisfies φ(X) by showing that σ
′
X satisfies all clauses of φ(X).
Let c j be a clause of φ(X), and consider clause feature D j. Because γ0[D j] = d j and γz[D j] = d j, there is an
index t such that γt[D j] = d j, γt+1[D j] = d j, and γt →D j γt+1. Since flipping D j has to be an improving flip, it1350
must be the case that there is a literal feature P j,k such that γt[P j,k] = p j,k. Therefore, since γ0[P j,k] = p j,k, there
is an index s < t such that γs[P j,k] = p j,k, γs+1[P j,k] = p j,k, and γs →P j,k γs+1. Now there are two cases: either
(a) ` j,k = xi, or (b) ` j,k = ¬xi. For (a), since flipping P j,k has to be an improving flip, it must be the case that
γs[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , therefore σ
′
X[xi] = true, and hence σ
′
X satisfies c j. For (b), again since flipping P j,k has to be
an improving flip, it must be the case that γs[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , therefore σ
′
X[xi] = false and hence σ
′
X satisfies c j.1355
Therefore, σ′X satisfies all clauses of φ, and hence σ
′
X is an extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X).
We now prove (2). We know that β ./F(φ) ασX if and only if ασX 6F(φ) β and β 6F(φ) ασX . First, observe that
ασX 6F(φ) β is always true, as there is no improving flipping sequence from β to ασX . Indeed, the values of variable
features in β cannot be flipped to their non-overlined values according to their CP tables in F(φ), because they are the
most preferred values and variable features do not have parents. So, β ./F(φ) ασX if and only if β 6F(φ) ασX . Hence,1360
showing that there is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β ./F(φ) ασX is equivalent to showing that
there is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β 6F(φ) ασX . However, we have already shown this
in (1).
Appendix A.2. Proofs for Section 4
Lemma 4.5. Let φ(X) be a 3CNF Boolean formula, and let α be the outcome ofMipo(φ) assigning non-overlined1365
values to all features. Then, φ(X) is satisfiable if and only if α is not Pareto optimal inMipo(φ).
Proof. To prove the statement of the lemma, we first show the two following properties.
Property 4.5.(1). If φ(X) is unsatisfiable, and β ∈ OMipo(φ) is an outcome such that β , α, then β N ipo1 α implies that
β 6N ipo2 α, and β N ipo2 α implies that β 6N ipo1 α.
Proof. By inspection of the proof of Lemma 3.1, since φ is unsatisfiable, there is no improving flipping sequence in1370
N ipo1 that from α arrives to an outcome in which the values of all the clause features of the net F(φ)
a are overlined.
For this reason, by the definition of the interconnecting net HC(m), in N
ipo
1 there is no improving flipping sequence
that from α arrives to an outcome in which the value of the apex of HC(m) is overlined. This implies, moreover, that
in N ipo1 there is no improving flipping sequence that from α arrives to an outcome in which the values of some of
the features of the net F(φ)b are overlined. So, any improving flipping sequence in N ipo1 from α arrives to outcomes1375
in which values of features of F(φ)a are overlined, while values of feature of F(φ)b are non-overlined.
Symmetrically, since φ is unsatisfiable, any improving flipping sequence in N ipo2 from α arrives to outcomes in
which values of features of F(φ)a are non-overlined, while values of feature of F(φ)b are overlined.
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Now, assume that β is such that β N ipo1 α, hence in N
ipo
1 there is an improving flipping sequence from α to β.
From what we have said, β is such that values of features of F(φ)a are overlined, while values of feature of F(φ)b1380
are non-overlined. Therefore, β cannot be reached through an improving flipping sequence in N ipo2 . Thus, β 6N ipo2 α.
Symmetrically, it can be shown that if β N ipo2 α, then β 6N ipo1 α.
Property 4.5.(2). If φ(X) is satisfiable, then outcome β assigning overlined values to all variable and clause features
ofMipo(φ) and to all features of HC(m) is such that β N ipo1 α and β N ipo2 α.
Proof. Since φ is satisfiable, by inspection of the proof of Lemma 3.1, there is an improving flipping sequence1385
in N ipo1 that from α arrives to an outcome α1 in which the values of all variable and clause features of F(φ)
a are
overlined. By definition of the interconnecting net HC(m), in N
ipo
1 there is also an improving flipping sequence that
from α1 arrives to an outcome α2 in which the values of all features (and also of the apex) of HC(m) are overlined.
This allows α2 to be further improved by a flipping sequence to an outcome α3 in which the values of all variable
and clause features of F(φ)b are overlined, because φ is satisfiable. Observe that α3 = β.1390
Symmetrically, it can be shown that in N ipo2 there exists an improving flipping sequence from α to the very
same β. Therefore, β N ipo1 α and β N ipo2 α.
The combination of the two properties above entails that φ(X) is satisfiable if and only if α is not a Pareto optimal
outcome ofMipo(φ).
Lemma 4.9. LetM be an acyclic mCP-net. Then,M has a Pareto optimum outcome if and only if all the individual1395
CP-nets ofM have the very same optimum outcome (that, in which case, is also the Pareto optimum outcome ofM).
Proof. We show first that ifM = 〈N1, . . . ,Nm〉 has a Pareto optimum outcome α, then all the individual CP-nets have
the very same optimum outcome, which is α. By definition, a Pareto optimum outcome is unique and Pareto dominates
all other outcomes. This means that, for any outcome β , α, and for all i, α Ni β. We know that in each individual
CP-net the only outcome dominating all the others is the individual optimum. Therefore, α equals all the individual1400
optimum outcomes. For the other direction of the proof, observe that, since all the CP-nets ofM have the very same
optimum outcome α, outcome α Pareto dominates all other outcomes, implying that α is Pareto optimum inM.
Theorem 4.10. LetM be an acyclic mCP-net, and let α ∈ OM be an outcome. Deciding whether α is Pareto optimum
inM is in LOGSPACE.
Proof. From Lemma 4.9, we know that α is Pareto optimum inM if and only if α equals all the individual optimum1405
outcomes of the individual CP-nets ofM. Therefore, in order to check whether α is actually Pareto optimum it suffices
to check, for each individual CP-net in turn, whether α is the individual optimal outcome for that agent. If α is different
from even one of the individual optimum outcomes, then α is not Pareto optimum. Remember that checking the
individual optimality of α is in LOGSPACE (see Theorem 3.7), and hence, by reuse of work space, we can check in
LOGSPACE whether α equals all the individual optimum outcomes.1410
Theorem 4.10. LetM be an acyclic mCP-net. Deciding whetherM has a Pareto optimum outcome is in P.
Proof. From Lemma 4.9, we know thatM has a Pareto optimum outcome if and only if all the individual CP-nets have
the very same individual optimum outcome. Hence, in order to decide whetherM has a Pareto optimum outcome, it
suffices to compute the individual optimum outcome of the first agent. We can do this in polynomial time [11]. After
this, we compare the just computed individual optimum outcome with all the other individual optimum outcomes. This1415
can be carried out, by reuse of work space, in logarithmic space (see Theorem 4.10), and hence in polynomial time (by
the inclusion LOGSPACE ⊆ P). If all the individual optimum outcomes are equal, then we answer yes, otherwise no.
Observe that the overall procedure is in P.
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Appendix A.3. Proofs for Section 5
Lemma 5.2. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over a set X of Boolean variables, and let σX be an1420
assignment on X. Let ασX be the outcome of Fs(φ) encoding σX on the feature set V, and assigning non-overlined
values to all other features. Let β be an outcome of Fs(φ) such that β[U1U2] = u1u2, assigning any value to the features
ofV, and assigning non-overlined values to all other features. Then:
(1) There is an extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β Fs(φ) ασX ;
(2) There is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β ./Fs(φ) ασX .1425
Proof. We first prove (1).
(⇒) Assume that there is an extension σ′X of σX to X satisfying φ(X). We show that β Fs(φ) ασX by exhibiting an
improving flipping sequence from ασX to β.
We claim that, by Lemma 3.1, outcome β (which is different from β) assigning overlined values to all variable
and clause features is such that β Fs(φ) ασX . Indeed, features inV ∪P ∪D are linked in Fs(φ) through the very1430
same links of a net F(φ). Moreover, the value u1 assigned to feature U1 in ασX selects in the CP tables of features
V ∪P ∪D specific preference rankings that are equivalent to those in the CP tables of featuresV ∪P ∪D in
F(φ). Now, since β Fs(φ) ασX , there is an improving flipping sequence from ασX to β. Then, we can flip the
values of all features of the interconnecting net HC(m) (including the apex) and of U2. Now we flip the value
of feature U1 from u1 to u1. Recall that in β, all variable features have overlined values, and their values have1435
not been flipped after outcome β was reached in the improving flipping sequence. Therefore, since the value of
U1 is u1, given the CP table of variable features, we can flip features inV to any configuration of values (even
leaving everything as it is), and in particular we can flip them to match the values of features ofV in β . Next, all
literal features can be flipped to their non-overlined values (recall that U1 has value u1 now). Then, we flip all
clause features to their non-overlined values, and after this, in the proper order, we can flip the features of the1440
interconnecting net to their non-overlined values. Observe that the obtained outcome is precisely β, and hence
β Fs(φ) ασX .
(⇐) Assume that β Fs(φ) ασX . We show that there is an extension σ′X of σX to X satisfying φ(X). Since β Fs(φ) ασX ,
there is an improving flipping sequence ρ : γ0 → . . .→ γz from γ0 = ασX to γz = β.
Since γ0[U1] = u1 and γz[U1] = u1, there must be an index s in which γs[U1] = u1, γs+1[U1] = u1, and1445
γs →U1 γs+1. Moreover, because U1 has no parents, in the sequence ρ, feature U1 can be flipped only once.
Therefore, for all p < s, αp[U1] = u1, and for all p > s, αp[U1] = u1.
We claim that we can assume w.l.o.g. that all variable features have overlined values in γs. Indeed, if this is
not the case, we can always modify as follows an improving flipping sequence ρ, from ασX to β, to obtain an
improving flipping sequence ρ′, from ασX to β, satisfying the required assumption. In particular, consider all1450
variable features F having non-overlined values just before feature U1 is flipped. We can flip all of them before
flipping U1 to u1, and, after having flipped U1, we can flip them all back to the values they had before. The new
sequence satisfies the required assumption, and, moreover, it is still improving, and it is still a sequence from ασX
to β.
Consider the truth assignment σ′X built as follows: If there is an index p < s such that γp[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , then1455
σ′X[xi] = true; if there is an index p < s such that γp[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , then σ
′
X[xi] = false.
We first show that σ′X is consistent, complete, and an extension of σX to X. Observe that, by the definition of
the CP tables of variable features, before the s-th step of the sequence, once a variable feature is flipped to
its overlined value, it cannot be flipped back (this may happen only after the s-th step). Therefore, it cannot
be the case that there are indices p < s and q < s for which there are variable features VTi and V
F
i such that1460
γp[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i and γq[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i . Hence, σ
′
X is consistent. Moreover, we claim that, for any variable
xi, there is always an index p < s such that γp[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i or γp[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , which implies that σ
′
X is
complete. Indeed, if xi has a value in σX , then the index p that we are looking for is p = 0 (because either
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γ0[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i or γ0[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , by the definition of γ0 = ασX ). Observe that this and the consistency of
σ′X proven above imply that σ
′
X[xi] = σx[xi] for each variable xi having a truth value in σX . On the other hand, if1465
xi has not a value in σX , then, since γ0[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , and we are assuming that γs[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , it must be
the case that there is an index p < s such that γp[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i or γp[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i . Hence, σ
′
X is complete.
To conclude, by all the properties above, σ′X is an extension of σX to X.
We now show that σ′X satisfies φ(X) by showing that σ
′
X satisfies all the clauses of φ(X).
Because γ0[U2] = u2 and γz[U2] = u2, there must be an index t such that γt[U2] = u2, γt+1[U2] = u2, and1470
γt →U2 γt+1. (Indices s and t are not in any particular relationship; it could be s < t but also t < s.) By the
definition of the CP tables, for γt →U2 γt+1 to be an improving flip, it must be the case that, for the apex A of the
interconnecting net, γt[A] = a. This requires that there is an index r < t, for which in γr all clause features have
their overlined values (because the conjunctive interconnecting net is linked to the set of clause features).
Let c j be any clause of φ(X), and consider feature D j. Because γ0[D j] = d j and γr[D j] = d j, there is an index1475
q < r such that γq[D j] = d j, γq+1[D j] = d j, and γq →D j γq+1. Since flipping D j has to be an improving flip,
it must be the case that there is a literal feature P j,k such that γq[P j,k] = p j,k. Therefore, since γ0[P j,k] = p j,k
and γq[P j,k] = p j,k, there is an index p < q such that γp[P j,k] = p j,k, γp+1[P j,k] = p j,k, and γp →P j,k γp+1. By the
definition of the CP table of P j,k, it must also be the case that p < s. This means that, for all the literal features
that in ρ change their value from non-overlined to overlined, their flipping happens before the s-th step. Hence,1480
if two different literal features linked to the same variable features VTi and V
F
i flip before the s-th step, then their
flipping is based on consistent values assigned to VTi and V
F
i .
Now there are two cases: either (a) ` j,k = xi, or (b) ` j,k = ¬xi. For (a), since flipping P j,k has to be an improving
flip, it must be the case that γp[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , therefore σ
′
X[xi] = true, and hence σ
′
X satisfies c j. For (b),
again since flipping P j,k has to be an improving flip, it must be the case that γp[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , therefore1485
σ′X[xi] = false, and hence σ
′
X satisfies c j.
Therefore, if β Fs(φ) ασX , then there is an extension σ′X of σX to X satisfying φ(X).
We now prove (2). We know that β ./Fs(φ) ασX if and only if ασX 6Fs(φ) β and β 6Fs(φ) ασX . First, observe that
ασX 6Fs(φ) β is always true, because there is no improving flipping sequence from β to ασX , as the value u1 of feature
U1 in β cannot be flipped in Fs(φ), because it is the most preferred value of U1, and U1 does not have parents. So,1490
β ./Fs(φ) ασX if and only if β 6Fs(φ) ασX . Hence, showing that there is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only
if β ./Fs(φ) ασX is equivalent to showing that there is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β 6Fs(φ) ασX .
However, we have already shown this in (1).
Lemma 5.11. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)¬φ(X,Y) be a quantified Boolean formula, where φ(X,Y) is a 3CNF Boolean formula,
defined over two disjoint sets X and Y of Boolean variables. Then, Φ is valid if and only ifMeml(Φ) has a majority1495
optimal outcome.
Proof. To prove the statement of the lemma, we have to analyze the majority dominance relationships between outcome
pairs. To organize this task, we define the following sets of outcomes:
• Od = Od′ ∪ Od′′ ∪ Od′′′, where
– Od′ = {β ∈ OMeml(Φ) | (∃F)(F ∈ (V′ ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A ∪ B) ∧ β[F] = f )};1500
– Od′′ = {β ∈ OMeml(Φ) | β[U1U2] , u1u2};
– Od′′′ = {β ∈ OMeml(Φ) | (∃i)(β[VTi VFi ] = vTi vFi )}.
• Oc = {β ∈ OMeml(Φ) | β < Od}.
The sets Od and Oc constitute a partition of OMeml(Φ). On the contrary, Od′, Od′′, and Od′′′, do not constitute a partition
of Od, because they are not disjoint. We show that only outcomes of a subset S (whose detailed characterization will be1505
given toward the end of the proof) of Oc might be majority optimal. We do so by showing that (1) all outcomes in
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(Od ∪ Oc) \ S are majority dominated by some other outcome, and hence they are not majority optimal; and that (2) all
outcomes in S , which might be empty, are not majority dominated, and hence they are majority optimal. Therefore,
Meml(Φ) has a majority optimal outcome if and only if S is non-empty.
We recall that, since Meml(Φ) is a 6CP-net, if α and β are two outcomes, |S Meml(Φ)(β, α)| ≥ 4 implies that1510
β majMeml(Φ) α.
Property 5.11.(1). Let β′ ∈ Od′ be an outcome. Then, β′ is not majority optimal inMeml(Φ).
Proof. There are two cases: either (1) β′[U1U2] , u1u2, or (2) β′[U1U2] = u1u2:
(1) Let γ be the outcome assigning non-overlined values to all features in (V ∪V′ ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A ∪ B), and
such that γ[U1U2] = β′[U1U2]. We prove that γ majMeml(Φ) β′. Consider net Neml3 . The following is an improving1515
flipping sequence from β′ to γ, showing that γ Neml3 β′. We flip to their non-overlined value, in the following
order, all features inV,V′,W, P,D, andA, having an overlined value in β′. Next, we flip in the proper order all
features in B having an overlined value in β′ to their non-overlined value. The outcome obtained is precisely γ.
Moreover, since Neml4 = N
eml
3 , γ Neml4 β′, as well. Now, observe that by the definition of Neml5 , γ Neml5 β′. We have
seen that there are three agents preferring γ to β′.1520
Now there are two cases: either (a) β′[U1] = u1, or (b) β′[U1] = u1:
(a) Let us focus on Neml1 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from β
′ to γ in Neml1 , showing that
γ Neml1 β′. Since β′[U1] = u1, we can flip to their non-overlined value all features inV andW having an overlined
value in β′. Next, we flip to their non-overlined value all features in P, D, A (in the proper order), V′, and B,
having an overlined value in β′. The outcome reached is exactly γ. Therefore, in (1)(a), there are four agents1525
preferring γ to β′, and hence γ majMeml(Φ) β′.
(b) As we are in (1)(b), β′[U1] = u1 and β′[U1U2] , u1u2, hence β′[U1U2] = u1u2. Let us focus on Neml2 . The
improving flipping sequence from β′ to γ in Neml1 in (1)(a) is also an improving flipping sequence from β
′ to γ in
Neml2 (because β
′[U2] = u2). Therefore, in (1)(b), there are four agents preferring γ to β′, and hence γ majMeml(Φ) β′.
(2) Let γ′ be the outcome assigning an overlined value only to U1. We prove that γ′ majMeml(Φ) β′. Consider net Neml1 .1530
By the definition of the net, we can flip U1 from u1 to u1. Once this is done, by performing the improving flipping
sequence from β′ to γ in Neml1 exhibited in (1)(a), we reach γ
′ in this case. Hence, γ′ Neml1 β′. Consider now net
Neml3 . Since β
′ ∈ Od′, there is a feature F ∈ (V′ ∪W ∪ P ∪D ∪A ∪ B) such that β′[F] = f . By the definition
of the disjunctive interconnecting net embedded in Neml3 , there is an improving flipping sequence from β
′ to an
outcome in which U1 has an overlined value (we flip the features in the interconnecting net until we flip its apex,1535
and then we flip U1 to its overlined value). At this point, by performing the improving flipping sequence from β′ to
γ in Neml3 shown in (1) we reach γ
′ in this case. Hence, γ′ Neml3 β′. Since Neml4 = Neml3 , γ′ Neml4 β′, as well. Finally,
by the definition of Neml5 , γ
′ Neml5 β′. Therefore, γ′ 
maj
Meml(Φ) β
′, and hence β′ is not majority optimal.
Property 5.11.(2). Let β′′ ∈ Od′′ be an outcome. Then, β′′ is not majority optimal inMeml(Φ).
Proof. By Property 5.11.(1) we can focus on those outcomes β′′ assigning non-overlined values to all features in1540
V′∪W∪P∪D∪A∪B. There are three cases: (1) β′[U1U2] = u1u2, (2) β′[U1U2] = u1u2, or (3) β′[U1U2] = u1u2:
(1) Let γ be the outcome such that, for all features F < {U1,U2}, γ[F] = β′′[F], and γ[U1U2] = u1u2 , β′′[U1U2].
By the definition of Neml2 , N
eml
3 , N
eml
4 , and N
eml
5 , γ Neml2 β′′, γ Neml3 β′′, γ Neml4 β′′, γ Neml5 β′′, respectively.
Therefore, γ majMeml(Φ) β′′, and β′′ is not majority optimal.
(2) Let γ be the outcome such that, for all features F < {U1,U2}, γ[F] = β′′[F], and γ[U1U2] = u1u2 , β′′[U1U2].1545
We show that γ majMeml(Φ) β′′. Consider net Neml1 . Since we are assuming that all features inA have non-overlined
value in β′′, we can flip U2 from u2 to u2. Hence, γ Neml1 β′′. By the definition of Neml3 , Neml4 , and Neml5 , γ Neml3 β′′,
γ Neml4 β′′, γ Neml5 β′′, respectively. Therefore, γ 
maj
Meml(Φ) β
′′, and β′′ is not majority optimal.
(3) Let γ be the outcome such that, for all features F < {U1,U2}, γ[F] = β′′[F], and γ[U1U2] = u1u2 , β′′[U1U2].
We show that γ majMeml(Φ) β′′. Consider net Neml2 . Since we are assuming that all features inA have non-overlined1550
value in β′′, we can flip U1 from u1 to u1. Hence, γ Neml2 β′′. Moreover, we are also assuming that all features in B
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have non-overlined value in β′′, which implies that in Neml3 we can flip U1 from u1 to u1. Therefore, γ Neml3 β′′.
Since Neml3 = N
eml
4 , γ Neml4 β′′, as well. Finally, by the definition of Neml6 , γ Neml6 β′′ (as we are assuming
β′′[U2] = u2). Thus, γ majMeml(Φ) β′′, and β′′ is not majority optimal.
Property 5.11.(3). Let β′′′ ∈ Od′′′ be an outcome. Then, β′′′ is not majority optimal inMeml(Φ).1555
Proof. By Properties 5.11.(1) and 5.11.(2), we can focus on those outcomes β′′′ assigning non-overlined values to all
features inV′ ∪W∪P∪D∪A∪B, and such that β′′′[U1U2] = u1u2. Since β′′′ ∈ Od′′′, there is a pair of features
(VTi ,V
F
i ) such that β
′′′[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i . Let γ be the outcome such that, for all features F < {VTi ,VFi ,U1,U2},
γ[F] = β′′′[F], γ[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , β
′′′[VTi V
F
i ], and γ[U1U2] = u1u2 , β
′′′[U1U2]. We show that γ majMeml(Φ) β′′′.
Consider net Neml1 . We can flip feature U1 from u1 to u1. Then, we can flip features V
T
i and V
F
i to their1560
non-overlined value. The reached outcome is precisely γ, and hence γ Neml1 β′′′.
Consider now net Neml3 . Since β
′′′[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , we can flip V
′
i from v
′
i to v
′
i . Then, we flip V
T
i and V
F
i to their
non-overlined value. At this point, since β′′′[U1U2] = u1u2, the improving flipping sequence in Neml3 exhibited in
Case (2) of Property 5.11.(1), in which the flips of features inV are ignored, is an improving flipping sequence
from β′′′ to γ in this case. Hence, γ Neml3 β′′′. Since Neml3 = Neml4 , γ Neml4 β′′′, as well.1565
Finally, by the definition of Neml5 , γ Neml5 β′′′. Therefore, γ 
maj
Meml(Φ) β
′′′.
The three properties above show that any outcome β ∈ Od is not majority optimal. Consider now outcomes in
Oc. Observe that, since Od and Oc are disjoint, all outcomes βc ∈ Oc are characterized by having all features in
V′∪W∪P∪D∪A∪B with non-overlined values, βc[U1U2] = u1u2, and, for all variables xi ∈ X, βc[VTi VFi ] , vTi vFi .
Given an assignment σX for the variables in X, we define βσX ∈ Oc as the outcome encoding σX over the feature1570
setV as usual. Denote by Witnc the set of all complete assignments σX over X such that (∀Y)¬φ(X/σX ,Y) is not valid
(i.e., such that φ(X/σX ,Y) is satisfiable). Let Witn be the set of all (partial or complete) assignments σX over X such
that there is an extension of σX to X belonging to Witnc, and let Witn be the set of all (partial or complete) assignments
over X not belonging to Witn. Recall that if σX is a complete assignment over X, then σX itself is the unique extension
of σX to X. Given the above definitions, OWitnc = {βσX ∈ Oc | σX ∈ Witn} and OWitnc = {βσX ∈ Oc | σX ∈ Witn} constitute1575
a partition of Oc. This implies that, if β ∈ Oc is an outcome, then there is a (partial or complete) assignment σX over
the variables in X such that β = βσX .
We show that all outcomes in OWitnc are not majority optimal, and that all outcomes in O
Witn
c are majority optimal
(i.e., OWitnc is the set S mentioned earlier).
Property 5.11.(4). Let βc ∈ OWitnc be an outcome. Then, βc is not majority optimal inMeml(Φ).1580
Proof. Let α be the outcome assigning overlined values only to U1 and U2. We show that α majMeml(Φ) βc. Let
σX ∈ Witn be the (partial or complete) assignment over X such that βc = βσX .
Consider the net Neml1 . First, note that, for any outcome βc ∈ Oc, βc assigns non-overlined values to all features
inV′ ∪ B. Therefore, the part of net Neml1 over feature setsV′ and B does not play an active role in any improving
flipping sequence (if exists) either from α to βc, or from βc to α, because in Neml1 , features inV′∪B have no parents,1585
and they have already their most preferred values in α and βc.
Consider now the non-quantified formula φ(X,Y). If we consider the set X ∪ Y of all the Boolean variables in φ,
the assignment σX is a partial assignment over X ∪ Y . Since σX ∈ Witn, there is an extension σ′X of σX to X such
that (∀Y)¬φ(X/σ′X ,Y) is not valid (i.e., φ(X/σ′X ,Y) is satisfiable), and hence there is an extension of σX to X ∪ Y
satisfying φ. Therefore, by Lemma 5.2, α Neml1 βc. Observe that the differences between Neml1 and Neml2 are only in1590
the roles of features U1 and U2, which are exchanged. Hence, by (an adaptation of) Lemma 5.2, α Neml2 βc, as well.
Consider now Neml5 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from βc to α. We flip U1 from u1 to u1,
and then U2 from u2 to u2. After this, we flip to their non-overlined value all features inV having overlined values
in βc. The outcome reached is precisely α, and hence α Neml5 βc.
Finally, consider net Neml6 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from βc to α. We flip U1 from u11595
to u1 (remember that βc[U2] = u2). Next, we flip U2 from u2 to u2. To conclude, we flip to their non-overlined
value all features inV having overlined values in βc. The outcome reached is precisely α, and hence α Neml6 βc.
Therefore, α majMeml(Φ) βc, and βc is not majority optimal.
41
The goal of the next properties is to show that outcomes in OWitnc are majority optimal. We prove this by showing that
any outcome βc ∈ OWitnc is not majority dominated by any other outcome. Note that, sinceMeml(Φ) is a 6CP-net, for1600
any two outcomes α and β, if |S Meml(Φ)(β, α)| ≤ 3, then β 6
maj
Meml(Φ) α.
Property 5.11.(5). Let βc ∈ OWitnc and γ be two outcomes such that there is a feature F ∈ (W∪P∪D∪A) for which
γ[F] , βc[F]. Then, γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
Proof. Since γ[F] , βc[F], and βc[F] = f because βc ∈ OWitnc ⊆ Oc, it must be the case that γ[F] = f . Therefore,
by the definition of Neml3 , N
eml
4 , and N
eml
5 , γ 6Neml3 βc, γ 6Neml4 βc, and γ 6Neml5 βc. Thus, |S Meml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤ 3, and1605
hence γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
Property 5.11.(6). Let βc ∈ OWitnc and γ be two outcomes such that there is a feature F ∈ (V′ ∪ B) for which
γ[F] , βc[F]. Then, γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
Proof. Since γ[F] , βc[F], and βc[F] = f because βc ∈ OWitnc ⊆ Oc, it must be the case that γ[F] = f . Therefore,
by the definition of Neml1 , N
eml
2 , and N
eml
5 , γ 6Neml1 βc, γ 6Neml2 βc, and γ 6Neml5 βc. Thus, |S Meml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤ 3, and1610
hence γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
Property 5.11.(7). Let βc ∈ OWitnc and γ be two outcomes such that γ[U1U2] , βc[U1U2] = u1u2. Then, γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
Proof. Consider first net Neml3 . Since βc ∈ OWitnc ⊆ Oc, all features in V′ ∪W ∪ P ∪ D ∪ A ∪ B have a non-
overlined value in βc, and there is no pair of features (VTi ,V
F
i ) such that βc[V
T
i V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i . Hence, the disjunctive
interconnecting net embedded in Neml3 cannot be exploited in any improving flipping sequence that aims at reaching1615
an outcome in which U1 or U2 has an overlined value. Hence, for any outcome γ such that γ[U1] = u1 or γ[U2] = u2,
γ 6Neml3 βc. By Neml3 = Neml4 , for any outcome γ such that γ[U1] = u1 or γ[U2] = u2, γ 6Neml4 βc, as well.
Since γ[U1U2] , βc[U1U2] = u1u2, there are the three cases (1) γ[U1U2] = u1u2, (2) γ[U1U2] = u1u2, or
(3) γ[U1U2] = u1u2:
(1) Let us focus on Neml1 . First note that, for any outcome βc ∈ Oc, βc assigns non-overlined values to all features1620
in V′ ∪ B, and by Property 5.11.(7) we can assume that γ assigns non-overlined values to features in V′ ∪ B.
Therefore, the part of net Neml1 over feature setsV′ and B does not play an active role in any improving flipping
sequence (if exists) either from γ to βc, or from βc to γ because, in Neml1 , features inV′ ∪ B have no parents, and
they have already their most preferred values in βc and γ.
Let σX ∈ Witn be the (partial or complete) assignment over X such that βc = βσX . Since σX ∈ Witn, there is no1625
extension σ′X of σX to X such that (∀Y)¬φ(X/σ′X ,Y) is not valid, (i.e., such that φ(X/σ′X ,Y) is satisfiable). Consider
the non-quantified formula φ(X,Y). If we consider the set X ∪ Y of all the Boolean variables in φ, the assignment
σX is a partial assignment over X ∪ Y . Since φ(X/σX ,Y) is not satisfiable, there is no extension of σX to X ∪ Y
satisfying φ. Therefore, by inspection of the proof of Lemma 5.2, in Neml1 there is no improving flipping sequence
from βc to an outcome in which U2 has an overlined value, hence γ 6Neml1 βc.1630
From this, and from what we have already shown for nets Neml3 and N
eml
4 , it follows that |S Meml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤ 3,
and hence γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
(2) If we focus on Neml2 , a similar argument to the one used in (1) for net N
eml
1 shows that γ 6Neml2 βc (simply observe
that the roles on U1 and U2 are exchanged). Again, from this, and from what we have already shown for nets Neml3
and Neml4 , it follows that |S Meml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤ 3, and hence γ 6
maj
Meml(Φ) βc.1635
(3) By combining the discussions in (1) and (2), it is possible to show that γ 6Neml1 βc and γ 6Neml2 βc (and that
γ 6Neml3 βc and γ 6Neml4 βc). Thus, |S Meml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤ 2, and hence γ 6
maj
Meml(Φ) βc.
Property 5.11.(8). Let βc ∈ OWitnc and γ be two outcomes such that there is a feature F ∈ V for which γ[F] , βc[F].
Then, γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
Proof. Let Change = {F ∈ V | βc[F] , γ[F]} be the set of all variable features inV changing value from βc to γ.1640
Let Up = {F ∈ V | βc[F] = f ∧ γ[F] = f } be the subset of Change containing the variable features inV changing
their value from non-overlined in βc to overlined in γ. Let Down = {F ∈ V | βc[F] = f ∧ γ[F] = f } be the subset
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of Change containing the variable features inV changing their value from overlined in βc to non-overlined in γ.
The sets Up and Down constitute a partition of Change, and, since from the statement of this property, we assume
that Change , ∅, it must be the case that (Up ∪ Down) , ∅. There are the two cases (1) Up , ∅, or (2) Up = ∅:1645
(1) Since there are variable features inV changing their value from non-overlined in βc to overlined in γ, by the
definition of Neml3 , N
eml
4 , and N
eml
5 , γ 6Neml3 βc, γ 6Neml4 βc, and γ 6Neml5 βc. Therefore, |S Meml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤ 3, and hence
γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
(2) Since Up = ∅ and Change , ∅, it must be the case that Down , ∅, and hence there are variable features inV
changing their value from overlined in βc to non-overlined in γ. Moreover, by Property 5.11.(7), we can assume1650
that γ[U1U2] = u1u2. Consider net Neml1 . Observe that feature U1 in N
eml
1 has no parents. Hence, once U1 is flipped
from u1 to u1, it cannot be flipped back. Therefore, since βc[U1] = γ[U1] = u1, in any improving flipping sequence
in Neml1 from βc to γ (if exists), feature U1 cannot be flipped at all. However, by the definition of the CP tables in
Neml1 , when U1 has value u1, variable features can be flipped only from non-overlined to overlined. Hence, from
Down , ∅ it follows that γ 6Neml1 βc. A similar argument (but focused on U2) shows that γ 6Neml2 βc and γ 6Neml6 βc.1655
Therefore, |S Meml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤ 3, and hence γ 6
maj
Meml(Φ) βc.
We are now ready to prove that Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)¬φ(X,Y) is valid if and only ifMeml(Φ) has a majority optimal outcome.
(⇒) Assume that Φ is valid, hence there is an assignment σX for the variables in X such that σX ∈ Witn. By
Properties 5.11.(5), 5.11.(6), 5.11.(7), and 5.11.(8), βσX is majority optimal inMeml(Φ), and henceMeml(Φ) has
a majority optimal outcome.1660
(⇐) Assume that Φ is not valid, hence there is no assignment in Witn, and so OWitnc is empty. By Properties 5.11.(1),
5.11.(2), 5.11.(3), and 5.11.(4), all outcomes in Od ∪ OWitnc are not majority optimal, and, since OWitnc is empty,
Meml(Φ) does not have a majority optimal outcome.
Lemma 5.15. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)¬φ(X,Y) be a quantified Boolean formula, where φ(X,Y) is a 3CNF Boolean formula,
defined over two disjoint sets X and Y of Boolean variables. Then, Φ is valid if and only if Mimm(Φ) does not1665
have a majority optimum outcome. In particular, whenMimm(Φ) has a majority optimum outcome it is the outcome
α ∈ OMimm(Φ) assigning overlined values only to features U1 and U2.
Proof. To prove the statement of the lemma we have to analyze the majority dominance relationship between α and the
other outcomes. To organize this task, let us define the following sets of outcomes:
• Od = Od′ ∪ Od′′ ∪ Od′′′, where1670
– Od′ = {β ∈ OMimm(Φ) | (∃F)(F ∈ (V′ ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A ∪ B) ∧ β[F] = f )};
– Od′′ = {β ∈ OMimm(Φ) | β[U1U2] , u1u2};
– Od′′′ = {β ∈ OMimm(Φ) | (∃i)(β[VTi VFi ] = vTi vFi )}.
• Oc = {β ∈ OMimm(Φ) | β < Od}.
The sets Od and Oc constitute a partition of OMimm(Φ). On the contrary, Od′, Od′′, and Od′′′, do not constitute a partition1675
of Od because they are not disjoint. Note that α ∈ Od′′. We show that α is the only outcome that might be majority
optimum. We do so by showing that (1) all outcomes different from α in Od ∪ Oc, but a specific subset S (whose
detailed characterization will be given toward the end of the proof) of outcomes of Oc, are majority dominated by α,
which means that all outcomes in (Od ∪ Oc) \ ({α} ∪ S ) are majority optimum; and that (2) all outcomes in S , which
might be empty, neither majority dominate, nor are majority dominated by, α, and hence they are not majority optimum.1680
Therefore, α is majority optimum if and only if S is empty.
Note that, by the definition of N imm2 , α N imm2 β for any outcome β , α, and hence, sinceMimm(Φ) is a 3CP-net, if
α N imm1 β or α N imm3 β, then α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) β.
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Property 5.15.(1). Let β′ ∈ Od′ be an outcome. Then, α majMimm(Φ) β′.
Proof. Since β′ ∈ Od′, let F ∈ (V′ ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A ∪ B) be a feature such that β′[F] = f . Because α[F] = f ,1685
β′ , α, and hence α N imm2 β′. Consider net N imm3 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from β′ to α in
N imm3 , showing that α N imm3 β′, and hence that α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) β
′. Since β′[F] = f , by the definition of the disjunctive
interconnecting net embedded in N imm3 , we can flip in the proper order some features of the interconnecting net to
their overlined values, until we flip its apex B. Once the apex has an overlined value, we flip to their overlined value
U1 and then U2 (if they do not have an overlined value already). After this, we flip to their non-overlined values1690
all features inV ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A having overlined values in β′. Next, we flip to their non-overlined values all
features inV′ having overlined values, and subsequently those in B having overlined values.
Property 5.15.(2). Let β′′ ∈ Od′′ be an outcome different from α. Then, α majMimm(φ) β′′.
Proof. Since we are assuming β′′ , α, it holds that α N imm2 β′′. There are the three cases (1) β′′[U1U2] = u1u2, or
(2) β′′[U1U2] = u1u2, or (3) β′′[U1U2] = u1u2:1695
(1) Let us focus on net N imm3 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from β
′′ to α in N imm3 , showing that
α N imm3 β′′, and hence that α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) β
′′. We can flip all features, but U1 and U2, to their non-overlined values in
a proper sequence which could beV,V′,W, P,D,A, and B.
(2) Let us focus again on net N imm3 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from β
′′ to α in N imm3 , showing
that α N imm3 β′′, and hence that α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) β
′′. Since β′′[U1U2] = u1u2, we can flip U2 from u2 to u2. Now we are1700
again in the case in which β′′[U1U2] = u1u2. Hence, there is an improving flipping sequence to α as shown in (1).
(3) Let us consider net N imm1 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from β
′′ to α in N imm1 , showing that
α N imm1 β′′, and hence that α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) β
′′. We can flip U1 from u1 to u1. Then, in the orderV,W, P,D,A,V′,
and B, we flip features having overlined values to their non-overlined values.
Property 5.15.(3). Let β′′′ ∈ Od′′′ be an outcome. Then, α majMimm(Φ) β′′′.1705
Proof. Since β′′′ ∈ Od′′′′, there is a pair of features (VTi ,VFi ) such that β′′′[VTi VFi ] = vTi vFi . Because α[VTi VFi ] =
vTi v
F
i , β
′′′ , α, and hence α N imm2 β′′′. Consider net N imm3 . We show that there is an improving flipping sequence
from β′′′ to α in N imm3 , proving that α N imm3 β′′′, and hence that α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) β
′′′.
Since β′′′[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i , if β
′′′[V ′i ] = v
′
i , we can flip the value of V
′
i from v
′
i to v
′
i . This bring us in the case in
which there is a feature F inV′ with overlined value. We have already shown in the proof of Property 5.15.(1) that1710
in N imm3 there exists an improving flipping sequence from this outcome to α.
The three properties above show that any outcome β ∈ Od that is different from α is majority dominated by α. This
proves that any such outcome β is not majority optimum, and that α majority dominates all of them.
Let us now consider outcomes in Oc. Observe that, since Od and Oc are disjoint, all outcomes βc ∈ Oc are
characterized by having all features inV′ ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A ∪ B with non-overlined values, βc[U1U2] = u1u2, and,1715
for all variables xi ∈ X, βc[VTi VFi ] , vTi vFi .
Given an assignment σX for the variables in X, we define βσX ∈ Oc as the outcome encoding σX over the feature
set V as usual. Let us denote by Witnc the set of all complete assignments σX over X such that (∀Y)¬φ(X/σX ,Y)
is not valid (i.e., such that φ(X/σX ,Y) is satisfiable). Let Witn be the set of all (partial or complete) assignments
σX over X such that there is an extension of σX to X belonging to Witnc, and let Witn be the set of all (partial or1720
complete) assignments over X not belonging to Witn. Remember that if σX is a complete assignment over X, then
σX itself is the unique extension of σX to X. Given the above definitions, OWitnc = {βσX ∈ Oc | σX ∈ Witn}, and
OWitnc = {βσX ∈ Oc | σX ∈ Witn} constitute a partition of Oc. This implies that, if β ∈ Oc is an outcome, then there is a
(partial or complete) assignment σX over the variables in X such that β = βσX .
We show that all outcomes in OWitnc are majority dominated by α, and that all outcomes in O
Witn
c are not majority1725
dominated by α and do not majority dominate α (i.e., OWitnc is the set S mentioned earlier).
For the following two properties it is useful to note that, for any outcome βc ∈ Oc, βc assigns non-overlined values
to all features inV′ ∪B, and also α assigns non-overlined values to features inV′ ∪B. Therefore, the part of net N imm1
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over feature setsV′ and B does not play an active role in any improving flipping sequence (if exists) either from α to
βc, or from βc to α because, in N imm1 , features inV′ ∪ B have no parents, and they have already their most preferred1730
values in α and βc.
Property 5.15.(4). Let βc ∈ OWitnc be an outcome. Then, α majMimm(Φ) βc.
Proof. Let σX ∈ Witn be the (partial or complete) assignment over X such that βc = βσX .
Let us focus on net N imm1 . Consider now the non-quantified formula φ(X,Y). If we consider the set X ∪ Y of
all the Boolean variables in φ, the assignment σX is a partial assignment over X ∪ Y . Since σX ∈ Witn, there is1735
an extension σ′X of σX to X such that (∀Y)¬φ(X/σ′X ,Y) is not valid (i.e., such that φ(X/σ′X ,Y) is satisfiable), and
hence there is an extension of σX to X ∪ Y satisfying φ. Therefore, by Lemma 5.2, α N imm1 βc. Since α ∈ Od′′ and
βc ∈ Oc, βc , α, and hence α N imm2 βc. Thus, α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) βc.
Property 5.15.(5). Let βc ∈ OWitnc be an outcome. Then, α 6majMimm(Φ) βc and βc 6
maj
Mimm(Φ) α.
Proof. Let σX ∈ Witn be the (partial or complete) assignment over X such that βc = βσX . Since σX ∈ Witn, there is1740
no extension σ′X of σX to X such that (∀Y)¬φ(X/σ′X ,Y) is not valid, (i.e., such that φ(X/σ′X ,Y) is satisfiable).
Now consider net N imm1 . We claim that βc ./N imm1 α. Consider the non-quantified formula φ(X,Y). If we
consider the set X ∪ Y of all the Boolean variables in φ, the assignment σX is a partial assignment over X ∪ Y .
Since φ(X/σX ,Y) is not satisfiable, there is no extension of σX to X ∪ Y satisfying φ. Therefore, by Lemma 5.2,
βc ./N imm1 α.1745
Now, since α ∈ Od′′ and βc ∈ Oc, βc , α, and hence α N imm2 βc. To conclude, let us now focus on net N imm3 . By
βc ∈ Oc, all features in B have non-overlined values, βc[U1U2] = u1u2, and there is no pair of features (VTi ,VFi )
such that βc[VTi V
F
i ] = v
T
i v
F
i . Since in N
imm
3 feature U1 is attached to the apex B of the interconnecting net, and U1
can be flipped from u1 to u1 only when the apex B of the interconnecting net has an overlined value, there is no
improving flipping sequence from βc to α, and hence α 6N imm3 βc.1750
To summarize, we showed that βc ./N imm1 α, α N imm2 βc, and α 6N imm3 βc. Therefore, α 6
maj
Mimm(Φ) βc, because
|S Mimm(Φ)(α, βc)| < 2, and βc 6
maj
Mimm(Φ) α, because |S Mimm(Φ)(βc, α)| < 2.
We are now ready to prove that Φ = (∃X)(∀Y)¬φ(X,Y) is valid if and only if α is not majority optimum inMimm(Φ).
(⇒) Assume that Φ is valid. By Properties 5.15.(1), 5.15.(2), 5.15.(3), and 5.15.(4), all outcomes in Od ∪ OWitnc
different from α are not majority optimum. Moreover, from Property 5.15.(5), all outcomes in OWitnc are not1755
majority optimum, and α does not majority dominate outcomes in OWitnc . Hence, also α is not majority optimum.
Therefore, inMimm(Φ) there is no majority optimum outcome.
(⇐) Assume that Φ is not valid, hence there is no assignment in Witn, and so OWitnc is empty. By Properties 5.15.(1),
5.15.(2), 5.15.(3), and 5.15.(4), all outcomes in Od ∪ OWitnc different from α are majority dominated by α. Since
OWitnc is empty, α majority dominates all other outcomes, which implies that inMimm(Φ) there is a majority1760
optimum outcome, which is α.
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